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INTRODUCTION 
In 941 A.D., Thuml al-Qahramana served in a judicial 
capacity after initially acting as an advisor to the Muslim head of 
state.1 She is the first, and perhaps only, Muslim female judge or 
“Qadiya” referenced in scholarly discourse on religion, gender, 
and the law.2 
Today, women serve in the judiciary in a number of Muslim 
majority societies, including the Sudan, Jordan, Palestinian 
territories, Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, and Morocco, among others.3 At least 
one country—Saudi Arabia—explicitly prohibits the 
appointment of women to the judiciary.4 And, while the majority 
                                                                                                             
* J.D., LL.M., Engy Abdelkader is the US Representative to the Advisory Panel of 
Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief at the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.  She is 
also the recipient of a US State Department Speaker and Specialist invitation-only grant 
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1. See AISHA BEWLEY, MUSLIM WOMEN: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 157 (Abia 
Afsar-Siddiqui ed., 2004). 
2. See, e.g., Nadia Maria El-Cheikh, The Qahramana in the Abbasid Court: Position and 
Functions, 97 STUDIA ISLAMICA 41, 53 (2003). 
3. See Margaret Besheer, For Muslim Women, Education, Economic Empowerment Are 
Keys to Better Life, VOICE AM. NEWS, Mar. 5, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4233966; see 
also Dima Amr, Legal Scholars, Religious Experts Debate Islam’s Position on Women Judges, 
MIDDLE E. NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 7948947; Bureau of Int’l 
Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Arab Women Judges and Lawyers Discuss Women’s 
Rights in Arab States, IIP DIGITAL (Feb. 24, 2004), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/
english/article/2004/02/20040224092239ndyblehs0.695141.html#axzz2dHQSOQ4D; 
Peter Kenyon, Female Judges in Egypt Battle Against Old Ideas, NPR (Apr. 3, 2010, 12:00 
AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125501126; UAE’s First 
Woman Judge Sworn-In, UAE INTERACT (Aug. 10, 2008), http://www.uaeinteract.com/
docs/UAEs_first_woman_judge_sworn-in/32305.htm; Salah Nasrawi, Woman Pursues 
Egyptian Judgeship, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 14, 1998, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/
1998/Woman-Pursues-Egyptian-Judgeship/id-7f46e49d0e327a4c32a3b1ec2e31968c; 
Ramadan Al Sherbini, Egypt Appoints 31 Women Judges for the First Time, GULF NEWS 
(Mar. 23, 2007), http://gulfnews.com/news/region/egypt/egypt-appoints-31-women-
judges-for-the-first-time-1.167750. 
4. See Ann Bayefsky, UN Outrage over Human Rights Abuses Baldly Selective, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 18616099 (“The Special Rapporteur on 
the Independence of the Judiciary . . . finds: ‘Saudi Arabia does not permit women 
judges . . . . It was believed that women were unlike men physically, emotionally and in 
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of Muslim countries have codified no such restrictions, a 
number have no women judges either.5 The subject is 
contentious and significant particularly amid fluid developments 
under the rubric of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and 
constitutional reform.6 
This Article explores the question of women’s agency vis-à-
vis a descriptive, comparative, and normative analysis of the 
experience of female judges in Muslim majority societies. 
Section I encompasses an introduction to core terms and 
concepts. Section II examines and catalogues the most 
prominent religious and cultural narratives used to facilitate 
women’s entry into and exclusion from the judiciary. Section III 
considers historical and contemporary experiences in Indonesia, 
Egypt, and Iran.7 The article concludes with a comparative 
analysis and normative discussion of the subject. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO CORE TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
A. Islam and Its Law 
Islam is the third of the Abrahamic faiths, following 
Judaism and Christianity.8 It presently ranks as the world’s 
second largest religion with practitioners spread across a 
spectrum of geographically diverse regions.9 According to 
Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammad10 began receiving 
                                                                                                             
thought and that only a small number of women had shown the intellectual maturity to 
become a judge.’”). 
5. See Amr, supra note 3; Kelleher, supra note 3; Kenyon, supra note 3; UAE’s First 
Woman Judge Sworn-In, supra note 3; Nasrawi, supra note 3. 
6. See Mary Fitzgerald, ‘We Have Found Our Voice and It Feels Good’, IRISH TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2012, at 5. 
7. The majority of Muslims are either Sunni (eighty to ninety percent) or Shi’a 
(ten to twenty percent). For purposes of this Article, Indonesian and Egyptian societies 
are largely informed by Sunni legal tradition while Iran is predominantly Shi’a. See 
generally Pew Research Ctr. Forum on Religion & Pub. Life, Mapping the Global Muslim 
Population (Sandra Stencel et al. eds., 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/
Muslim/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population(6).aspx. 
8. See Engy Abdelkader, Animal Protection Theory in U.S. and Islamic Law, A 
Comparative Analysis with a Human Rights Twist 4 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
9. See Abdelkader, supra note 8. 
10. All references to the Prophet Muhammad should be read as encompassing the 
parenthetical “peace be upon him.” 
312 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:309 
Divine revelation in the seventh century while residing in a 
largely pagan society on the Arabian Peninsula.11 These 
revelations, depicted as having been conveyed to him by the 
angel Gabriel, occurred in a piecemeal fashion spanning a 
twenty-three year period,12 and consisted of moral guidance and 
legal principles as well as instructive responses to developing 
events.13 
Literally meaning “reading” or “recitation,”14 the Quran is 
comprised of these revelations to the Prophet Muhammad.15 
The text consists of 114 separately titled chapters16 of varying 
lengths17 that do not adhere to any thematic order or 
arrangement.18 As such, Islamic scholars have characterized the 
Quran as an indivisible whole to be followed in its entirety.19 
Since Muslims regard the Quran as the verbatim word of 
God, it represents the first source of moral guidance and Islamic 
law.20 
                                                                                                             
11. See Abdelkader, supra note 8; see also SUSAN A. SPECTORSKY, WOMEN IN 
CLASSICAL ISLAMIC LAW: A SURVEY OF THE SOURCES 4 (2011). Muslims regard the 
Prophet Muhammad as the seal to a long spiritual tradition inaugurated by the Prophet 
Adam and which also encompasses the guidance of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, among 
other Messengers and Prophets. 
12. See SPECTORSKY, supra note 11; see also MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, 
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 19 (3d ed. 2005). The Quran itself explains the 
rationale of graduality in its revelation in the following manner: “The unbelievers say, 
why has not the Quran been sent down to him [Muhammad] all at once. Thus [it is 
revealed] that your hearts may be strengthened, and We rehearse it to you gradually, 
and well arranged.” QUR’AN, Sūra XXV: Al-Furqan, verse 32. Therefore Quranic 
legislation was revealed piecemeal so as to avoid overwhelming and overburdening the 
faith’s new adherents. See SPECTORSKY, supra note 11. See generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, 
SHARIA: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 31 (2009). 
13. See HALLAQ, supra note 12, at 342; see also SPECTORSKY, supra note 11; KAMALI, 
supra note 12, at 16–17. 
14. See KAMALI, supra note 12, at 16. 
15. See id. (“The revelation of the Qur’ān began with the [Chapter] al-’Alaq 
(96:1) starting with the words ‘Read in the name of your Lord’ and ending with the 
[verse] in [Chapter] al-Mā’idah (5:3): ‘Today I have perfected your religion for you 
and completed my favor toward you, and chosen Islam as your religion.’”); HALLAQ, 
supra note 12, at 39. 
16. See KAMALI, supra note 12, at 17. Chapters are also known as “sūras.” 
17. See id. (“The shortest of the sūras consist of four and the longest of 286 
[verses].”). 
18. See id. at 17–18 (“The [verses] on various topics appear in unexpected places, 
and no particular order can be ascertained in the sequence of its text.”). 
19. See id. at 18. 
20. See id. at 4. 
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It is interesting to note that while the Quran is held to yield 
legal certainty because it is believed to represent the literal 
expression of God, it does not represent a code of laws21 as often 
speculated. Rather, the text depicts itself as guidance to 
humankind.22 It is comprised of more than 6200 verses and less 
than one-tenth consists of legal material.23 Indeed, there are 
approximately 350 verses relating to matters of legal 
importance, such as prohibiting the custom of female 
infanticide or unrestricted polygamy.24 In fact, the crux of the 
text relates to belief, morality, and spirituality.25 
As the first and primary textual source of law,26 the Quran 
articulates specific guidelines and general principles on major 
subjects of legal importance.27 A ruling of the Quran may be 
conveyed in a text that is either unequivocal and clear, or in 
language that is susceptible to different interpretations.28 A 
definitive text is one that is clear and specific with no other 
interpretations.29 Scholars opine, however, that Quranic 
                                                                                                             
21. See SPECTORSKY, supra note 11. 
22. See Abdelkader, supra note 8, at 14. See generally, HALLAQ, supra note 12. 
23. See KAMALI, supra note 12, at 25–26 (“There are close to 350 legal [verses] in 
the Qur’ān, most of which were revealed in response to problems that were actually 
encountered. Some were revealed with the aim of repealing objectionable customs . . . . 
Others laid down penalties with which to enforce the reforms that the Qur’ān had 
introduced.”). 
24. See Abdelkader, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
25. See KAMALI, supra note 12, at 26 (“Its ideas of economic and social justice, 
including its legal contents, are on the whole subsidiary to its religious call.”). 
26. See Abdelkader, supra note 8, at 5; see also KAMALI, supra note 12, at 11–12. The 
Quranic verse provides the textual authority for all material sources of the Shariah, 
namely the Quran, the sunnah, consensus, and analogy. The ayah reads: “O you who 
believe, obey God and obey the Messenger, and those of you who are in authority; and 
if you have a dispute concerning any matter refer it to God and to the Messenger.”  
QUR’AN, Sūra IV: Al-Nisa, verse 58. “Obey God” in this ayah refers to the Quran as the 
first source and “and obey the Messenger” refers to the Sunnah of the Prophet, while 
“those of you who are in authority” authorizes the consensus of the ulema. See KAMALI, 
supra note 12, at 11–12.  
27. See Abdelkader, supra note 8, at 19; see also KAMALI, supra note 12, at 16–17 
(“[Some ulema] even say that [the Quran] is the only source and that all other sources 
are explanatory to the Qur’ān . . . . The revelation of the Qur’ān began with the sūra al-
’Alaq (96:1) starting with the words, ‘Read in the name of your Lord’ and ending with 
the āyah in sūra al-Mā’idah (5:3): ‘Today I have perfected your religion for you and 
completed my favour toward you, and chosen Islam as your religion.’ Learning and 
religious guidance, being the first and the last themes of the Qur’ānic revelation, are 
thus the favour of God upon mankind.”). 
28. See KAMALI, supra note 12, at 27. 
29. See id. at 27–28. 
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legislation consists largely of general principles.30 The question 
of context, interpretation, and proper application is critical to 
gender rights discourse, as depicted further below. 
Those Quranic verses establishing a general legal principle 
will require additional elaboration from the Sunnah or Hadith 
literature, the subsidiary source of religious law.31 The Sunnah 
encompasses the Prophet Muhammad’s conduct.32 Believed to 
have led by word and deed, the Prophet Muhammad’s 
conduct—or Sunnah—was emulated by his contemporaries.33 
During his lifetime the Prophet Muhammad explained and 
interpreted the Quran as lawgiver and adjudicator.34 Following 
his demise, Muslims turned to the Prophet Muhammad’s 
conduct as an authoritative source of moral, spiritual, and legal 
guidance.35 The Sunnah is reflected in written narrations 
referred to as Hadith.36 
The hadith are comprised in canonical collections,37 and 
often represent the substantive basis of scholarly knowledge 
concerning Islam’s formative period.38 An individual hadith 
typically consists of information concerning something the 
Prophet Muhammad did, said or affirmed through silence.39 It 
also specifies the chain of individuals responsible for substantive 
transmission to ensure authenticity.40 
Significantly, disagreement surrounds the authenticity of 
particular hadith narrations even today.41 This is particularly 
                                                                                                             
30. See id. at 38 (“The often-quoted declaration that ‘We have neglected nothing 
in the Book’ (al-An’ām, 6:38) is held to mean that . . . the general principles of law and 
religion are exhaustively treated in the Qur’ān.”). 
31. See Abdelkader, supra note 8, at 5; see also KAMALI, supra note 12, at 28. 
32. See Abdelkader, supra note 8, at 5; see also SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 4. 
33. See SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 4. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. See generally HALLAQ, supra note 12. 
36. KAMALI, supra note 12, at 29. 
37. See JUDITH E. TUCKER, THEMES IN ISLAMIC LAW: WOMEN, FAMILY, AND GENDER 
IN ISLAMIC LAW 12 (Wael B. Hallaq ed., 2008). 
38. See SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 7. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. (“In an isnād the person relating the matn of the tradition should have 
heard it from a reliable transmitter who in turn heard it from another, most likely 
slightly older, transmitter and so on, back to the person who is the subject of the matn 
or who first related it. An isnād that ends with ‘on the authority of the Prophet’ means 
that the matn reports an action, saying, or affirmation made by the Prophet himself.”). 
41. See TUCKER, supra note 37. 
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relevant for the instant discourse because several hadith are 
frequently cited as legal authority to support a gender rights-
restrictive position.42 The role of hadith, and lingering concerns 
about authenticity, are also examined below. 
Nonetheless, the Hadith literature represents the secondary 
source of Islamic law.43 While no Hadith enjoys the legal stature 
of a Quranic verse,44 Hadith frequently complement and 
supplement the primary textual source.45 Pursuant to this 
hierarchal legal framework, when confronted with a legal 
quandary, one initially engages the Quran for instruction.46 In 
absence of Quranic guidance, one consults the Hadith 
literature.47 
In the event the Quran sets forth only a general principle, 
one turns to the Hadith for additional explication.48 For these 
reasons, Hadith influenced the development of Islamic law49—
the narrations enhanced Quranic interpretation and 
comprehension, and also inspired insight concerning matters 
the Quran did not address.50 
Traditionally, interpretation of the Quran and Hadith were 
exclusive functions of trained Islamic jurists.51 It was his or her 
responsibility to interpret religious texts in accordance to time, 
circumstance, and the public interest.52 Further, they were 
required to engage the textual sources in proper historical 
context, with consideration to the circumstances and causes 
preceding the pertinent text.53 
These will prove to be significant considerations to the 
instant inquiry because interpretation of Islamic law’s primary 
sources falls into one of two categories: gender rights restrictive 
                                                                                                             
42. See id. 
43. See Abdelkader, supra note 8, at 5. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 12–13. It bears noting that in Shi’a Islam, the use 
of hadith is much more select, with only those traditions related by a sect’s leaders or 
imams enjoying acceptance. See id. 
50. See Abdelkader, supra note 8, at 5; see also TUCKER, supra note 37, at 13. 
51. See KAMALI, supra note 12, at 30. 
52. See id. 
53. See JAMAL BADAWI, GENDER EQUITY IN ISLAM: BASIC PRINCIPLES 2 (1995). 
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or rights empowering interpretations. The former translates into 
harsh realities for significant segments of the world’s Muslim 
female population, including those aspiring to the judiciary. 
B. The “Qadi” or Judge 
Insight into the judge’s historical role, including 
qualifications and functions, may provide greater depth and 
understanding to contemporary challenges confronting Muslim 
women. Notably, the pre-modern Muslim judge functioned in a 
manner wholly distinct from his modern Western counterpart.54 
As an initial matter, mediation figured prominently in 
resolving disputes arising in pre-industrial Islamic societies.55 
These disputes encompassed quasi-legal matters as well as those 
arising between siblings or spouses.56 
Notably, the adjudicatory process was intertwined with the 
disputant’s social realities.57 Judges resolved conflicts by 
examining the broader social context in which they arose with 
an overarching goal of maintaining the parties’ future social 
relationship.58 This required judicial familiarity with, and a 
willingness to investigate the dynamics of, the relationship and 
history of exchanges between disputants.59 This is because justice 
(as envisioned in classical Islamic law) not only required 
resolving a conflict, but doing so in such a manner that returns 
“people back into a position where they can, with the least 
adverse implications for the social order, continue to negotiate 
their own arrangements with one another.”60 The court of pre-
                                                                                                             
54. See HALLAQ, supra note 12. 
55. See id. at 159. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. at 168–69 (“Every case was considered on its own terms, and defined by 
its own social context. Litigants were treated not as cogs in the legal process, but as 
integral parts of larger social units, structures and relations that informed and were 
informed by each litigant. The qādī’s accommodation of litigants-as-part-of-a-larger-
social-relationship was neither the purely customary mode of negotiation (prevailing in 
the pre-trial stage) nor the black and white, all-or-nothing approach (mostly prevailing 
in systems where the judge is socially remote from the disputants).”). 
58. See id. at 166. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. at 165–66 (“Nearly all else was subject to what one perceptive 
commentator labeled as ‘separate justices,’ whereby judges cared less for the 
application of a logically consistent legal doctrine or principle than for the creation of 
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industrial Islamic societies also provided a venue where justice 
was dealt regardless of the wealth, status, or identities of the 
disputants.61 The court was committed to universal principles of 
law, creating a legal culture defined by social and moral equity.62 
It represented a venue anyone could utilize to resolve a 
conflict.63 Absent from the picture are highly formalized 
processes and costly legal representation.64 The judge was tasked 
with upholding these ideals.65 
While adjudicating matters, the judge was required to 
remain respectful of the parties and provide his undivided 
attention.66 He was expected to recuse himself from cases 
involving friends or relatives to preserve impartiality.67 In fact, to 
ensure the integrity of the court, a group of legal scholars 
attended the court sessions to oversee the proceedings.68 The 
judge was permitted to review his predecessor’s prior decisions 
as his were subject to review as well.69 
In addition to resolving disputes, the judge’s typical 
activities included supervising charitable trusts; acting as a 
guardian over orphans; attending to public works; and leading 
Friday prayers and funeral prayers (an exclusively male 
                                                                                                             
a compromise that left the disputants able to resume their previous relationships in the 
community and/or their lives as these had been led before the dispute began.”). 
61. See id. at 167. 
62. See id.; see also HAUWA IBRAHIM, PRACTICING SHARIAH LAW: SEVEN STRATEGIES 
FOR ACHIEVING JUSTICE IN SHARIAH COURTS 58 (2012) (“Caliph Ali Ibn Talib—the 
cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad and fourth of the ‘rightly guided 
Caliphs’ who succeeded the Prophet—was adopted by the prophet Muhammad and 
educated under his care. In one of Ali’s earliest declarations on the importance of an 
independent judiciary, he envisioned a judiciary that would be ‘above every kind of 
executive pressure or influence, fear or favor, intrigue or corruption.’ So important was 
this principle that some Muslim judges at that time were willing to be put to death, 
tortured, or dismissed rather than sacrifice the independence of their office.”). 
63. See HALLAQ, supra note 12, at 167. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at 343; see also IBRAHIM, supra note 62, at 58–59 (“Ali further remarked 
that a judge should ‘avoid fatigue, weariness, and annoyance at litigants. 
Understanding the nature of the case posited before him, [the judge] must consider all 
people equal before [them], in his court, so that the nobility will not expect to receive 
partial treatment and the humble will not despair for justice. The claimant must 
produce proof while the court will extract an oath of truth from the defendant.”). 
67. See HALLAQ, supra note 12, at 343. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. 
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province), among other responsibilities.70 Notably, the courts 
also functioned as judicial registries.71 Transfers of real and 
movable property, loans, manumissions, bonds of surety, 
business partnerships, marriages, divorces, estates, divisions of 
inheritance, and religious conversions, among other 
transactions, were all recorded at court and copies of the registry 
issued to the relevant parties.72 
Notably, the Quran and Hadith literature do not provide 
explicit provisions setting forth necessary qualifications or 
credentials concerning service in the judiciary—although 
Islamic scholars will later draw upon both of these textual 
sources to support opinions on the subject. The earliest judges 
appear to have been males who successfully served as tribal 
arbitrators.73 As the Muslim community continued to develop, 
the court became a place of prestige and authority; this 
perception continues in some segments of the Muslim world, 
but not in others.74 The judge’s knowledge of religious legal 
doctrine earned him deference and authority.75 In pre-Industrial 
Islamic societies, judicial service was viewed as fulfillment of a 
religious duty to ensure the administration of justice.76 
It is interesting to note that as the Islamic legal system 
evolved, judges would come to rely heavily upon “Muftīs,” legal 
experts who issued “fatwa” or legal opinions representing an 
                                                                                                             
70. See id. at 54. 
71. See id. at 175. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. at 36. 
74. See id. at 52. 
75. See id. 
76. See IBRAHIM, supra note 62, at 59 (“Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, one of the 
prophet Muhammad’s companions and the second rightly guided Caliph, noted that 
‘[t]he office of the Judge is a definite religious duty, and as such, is a generally followed 
practice.’ He wrote to judges: ‘Administration of Justice is an essential service and 
practice of the Prophet, which must be followed. So strive to understand reasons put 
before you and enforce the judgment on the basis of truth whenever it is clear because 
there is no point laboring for truth without enforcing it. Treat all manner of people 
who appear before you as equals showing the equality in your demeanor to the parties, 
the sitting arrangements and the way you dispense justice, so that the weak will not 
despair and be frustrated about your ability to do justice and the noble will not take you 
for granted. The onus of proof is on him who makes a claim and the oath is on he who 
denies it.’” (quoting M. A. AMBALI, THE PRACTICE OF MUSLIM FAMILY LAW IN NIGERIA 
98 (1998)). 
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authoritative statement of the law.77 In practice, litigants 
frequently solicited such opinions from a Mufti prior to 
appearing in court, and that opinion was typically dispositive of 
the case outcome.78 Often a litigant who could not secure a 
favorable opinion would not pursue his case in court.79 In 
complex cases where such an opinion had not already been 
sought, the judge would request an expert opinion from the 
Mufti.80 
Over time, these legal opinions (as opposed to the court 
decisions) were collected and published.81 The collections 
represented comprehensive accounts of the law.82 Significantly, 
there is positive historical evidence of women issuing legal 
opinions, in a similar capacity as Muftis, including the Prophet 
Muhammad’s wife, Aisha bint Abu Bakr—a fact that has been 
used to buttress arguments in favor of Muslim women judges, as 
depicted below.83 
However, the scholarly literature typically references judges, 
muftis and other legal experts as males.84 Women are sometimes 
mentioned as expert witnesses in the realm of ‘women’s issues.’85 
They were perhaps most prominently litigants, exercising agency 
vis-à-vis the Islamic legal system by actively seeking appropriate 
redress for perceived grievances.86 For instance, women 
appeared in court, argued vociferously and sought prompt 
payment of their dowry, alimony and child support payments 
and shares of inheritance.87 As previously noted, however, the 
                                                                                                             
77. See HALLAQ, supra note 12, at 177. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. 
83. See, e.g., MAULANA ABDUS-SALAM NADVI ET AL., BIOGRAPHIES OF THE WOMEN 
COMPANIONS OF THE HOLY PROPHET AND THE WAYS OF THEIR SACRED LIVES 42 (2000) 
(“[Aisha] used to issue ‘FATWA’ (legal decision under Islamic jurisprudence) during 
the Caliphats of Hazrat Abu Bakr, Hazrat Umar and Hazrat Uthman.”). 
84. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 32. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 33. 
87. See HALLAQ, supra note 12, at 168 (“Taking advantage of largely unrestricted 
access to the court in litigating pecuniary and other transactions, women asserted 
themselves in the legal arena in large numbers and, once there, they argued as 
vehemently and ‘volubly’ as men, if not more so.”). 
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female judge is absent from scholarly inquiry and her reference 
prompts contentious debate. 
II. THE NARRATIVES 
Legal and juristic developments often represent social 
manifestations of prevailing attitudes, norms, and customs.88 As 
in a number of societies, popular opinion in Muslim majority 
lands are influenced by various social, political, and, 
increasingly, religious considerations.89 The influence of religion 
upon law and society has become increasingly pronounced 
following the events under the rubric of the ‘Arab Spring.’90 
Illustrative are the results of public opinion polling conducted 
by the Pew Research Center, for instance, finding that six in ten 
Egyptians desire laws strictly adhering to Quranic injunctions.91 
Approximately a third desire adherence to Islamic principles but 
not necessarily strict conformance with the Quran, and only six 
percent believe that that the Quran should play no role.92 These 
statistics underscore the significance of religious narratives, 
liberal and conservative, particularly as they influence women’s 
lives and choices. 
Islamic considerations are particularly dispositive of gender 
rights inquiries in the Muslim world.93 For many Muslims 
                                                                                                             
88. See Essam Fawzi, Women Occupying Judiciary Positions in Egypt, in WOMEN JUDGES 
IN THE ARAB REGION: POINT, COUNTERPOINT 21 (Abdel Moneim Muslim ed., 2001). 
89. See id. 
90. See Most Egyptians Want Their Laws to Strictly Follow the Quran, PEW RES. CTR., 
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1647. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See BADAWI, supra note 53, at 44–45. (“International bodies and women’s 
rights organizations tend to consider documents and resolutions passed in conferences 
as the ultimate basis and standard expected of all diverse peoples, cultures and 
religions. Committed Muslims, however, both men and women, believe in the ultimate 
supremacy of what they accept as God’s divine revelation (the Qur’an and authentic 
hadith). To tell Muslims that one’s religious convictions should be subservient to 
‘superior’ man-made (or woman-made) standards or to secular humanism, is neither 
acceptable nor practical. Even if pressures, economic or otherwise, are used to bring 
about compliance with such resolutions or documents, the resulting changes are not 
likely to be deep-rooted and lasting. For Muslims, divine injunctions and guidance are 
not subject to a ‘voting’ procedure or to human election, editing, or whimsical 
modifications. They constitute, rather, a complete way of living within Islam’s spiritual, 
moral, social, political and legal parameters. Imposed cultural imperialism is not the 
solution.”). 
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around the globe—from conservatives to moderates to 
progressives—determining the acceptability of a practice largely 
depends upon the Islamic stance.94 Moreover, this is also true of 
women whose choices are often influenced, to varying degrees, 
by these same considerations.95 Note, many Muslim women who 
challenge the status quo are attacked as agents of ‘the West,’ 
‘secular,’ or apostates.96 
This is no less true of the debate surrounding Muslim 
women judges. At times, the question of Muslim women judges 
evokes surprise at its even being posed; it provokes anger and 
consternation in others.97 Let us now turn to the emerging 
narratives employed to facilitate women’s entry into and 
exclusion from the judiciary. 
A. The Rights Restrictive Stance 
This subsection identifies, catalogues, and describes the 
gender rights restrictive arguments challenging women’s 
ascension to the bench. 
The first, the “Islamic School of Law Argument,” revolves 
around the majority opinion of the pre-modern Islamic jurists. 
By way of background, following the demise of the Prophet 
Muhammad, his companions and successors settled into 
numerous cities within the early Muslim empire attempting to 
incorporate Islamic beliefs and practices into existing legal 
institutions already in place.98 Variations in custom and 
traditions characterized each of these townships, thus 
influencing the practice and interpretation of the law including 
the Quran and Sunnah.99 Indeed, while there was often general 
agreement concerning the broad contours of the law, there were 
frequent disagreements about the most legally appropriate way 
to proceed in a specific circumstance.100 
                                                                                                             
94. See KECIA ALI, SEXUAL ETHICS & ISLAM: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON QUR’AN, 
HADITH AND JURISPRUDENCE xii (2008). 
95. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 21. 
96. See ALI, supra note 94, at xiii. 
97. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 22. 
98. See SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 13. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. at 13–14 (“Sometimes disagreement was between cities: the scholars of 
Kufa, for example, would disagree with those of Medina; at other times it was local, and 
the Kufans or the Medinese might disagree among themselves.”). 
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As a result of these early disagreements, a number of 
different schools of law (“madhhabs”) emerged—each of which 
was defined by foundational texts, teachings, and other 
scholarship consisting of rules and principles to assist 
subsequent scholars in deriving law.101 Each of the Sunni schools 
of law would come to be known by its eponymous102 founders: 
Abū Hanifa (767), Māalik b. Anas (795), Shāafi’ī (820) and 
Ahmad b. Hanbal (855).103 Their teachings comprise the 
substantive material of classical Islamic law.104 
Notably, the teachings and principles espoused by these 
founding scholars continue to resonate today with each holding 
sway in a specific region of the Muslim world.105 Even today, the 
pre-modern jurists’ opinions on the question of female judges 
continue to be cited to support rights restrictive positions. 
Indeed, the majority of the Sunni schools of law—Maliki, Shafii, 
and Hanbali—opine that judges must be male.106 Only if there 
exists a pressing need, the Hanbali and Shafii schools elaborate, 
may women then serve in a judicial capacity.107 Egyptian scholars 
have adopted the Hanafi position in recent years, while the 
Shafii school dominates in Indonesia, discussed in greater detail 
below.108 
                                                                                                             
101. See id. at 14 (“As part of this process, early on in the formative period, jurists 
developed a set of five qualifications into which all human acts can be divided. An 
obligatory act is a fard or a wājib. Performing it leads to reward, omitting it to 
punishment. At the other end of the scale are acts that are forbidden (harām) and lead 
to punishment. In between are those acts that are recommended (mandūb or 
mustahabb), neutral or indifferent (mubāh), and disapproved of (makrūh). These middle 
three categories, which provide room for nuance and interpretation, are the 
qualifications jurists were most concerned with evaluating.”). 
102. See id. at 9. (“They are more properly referred to as eponymous founders, for 
they did not in any way claim to be establishing schools; rather, subsequent generations 
of students recorded their teaching and built on their works, thereby turning them 
retrospectively into the founders of the four Sunni madhhabs.”). 
103. See id. (specifically, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali). 
104. See id. at 3. 
105. See HALLAQ, supra note 12. 
106. See id. at 342 n.3 (“The majority of the jurists, including the Twelver-Shi’ītes, 
espoused the view that only a man can be a qādī.”). 
107. See BADAWI, supra note 53; see also Fawzi, supra note 88. 
108. See M.B. Hooker, The State and Shari’a in Indonesia, in SHARI’A AND POLITICS 
IN MODERN INDONESIA 33, 36 & 47 n.7 (Arskal Salim & Azyumardi Azra eds., 2003); see 
also Amina Elbendary, Women on the Bench, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ONLINE, Jan. 9–15, 2003, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/620/fr2.htm 
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In contrast, the Maliki prohibition against female judges is 
unequivocal.109 The Shiites, dominant in Iran, share the Maliki 
perspective.110 The majority view frequently relies on rights 
restrictive interpretations of the Quran to buttress their 
argument.111 
Indeed, the pre-modern Islamic scholars understood men 
and women as fulfilling distinct and complementary social roles, 
citing the primary textual sources to support a gender 
hierarchy.112 Specifically, they cite one particular verse113 to find 
that the Quran designates men as the financial providers for a 
household—thus, as bread-winner, he enjoys ultimate legal 
rights of authority.114 
This gendered division of social roles continues to spur 
debate. Moreover, it resonates beyond the domestic realm115: 
women are prohibited from assuming the role of financial 
provider, a role delegated exclusively to men.116 Further, since 
the verse presumably assigns men guardianship over women, 
some reasoned that women cannot undertake judicial authority 
because they could then exercise guardianship over men.117 This 
represents the Islamic School of Law Argument. 
                                                                                                             
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 24–25. Notwithstanding a number of 
egalitarian, non-discriminatory Quranic verses, one particular verse has proven critical 
to justifying the assignment of such social roles: 
“Men are the managers of the affairs of women 
For that God has preferred in bounty 
One of them over another, and for that 
They have expended of their property.”  
For an egalitarian interpretation of this verse, see BADAWI, supra note 53.. 
114. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 24 (“There are verses that have provided the 
basis on which to build gender hierarchies. Out of a total of 6,660 verses in the Qur’an, 
it has been argued that only six establish some kind of male authority over women.”). 
The six verses are 2:221, 2:228, 2:282, 4:3, 4:34, 24:30. See id. at 24 n.34. 
115. See id. at 25 (“Although this was interpreted strictly speaking as a familial 
relationship, with no necessary implications for social roles outside the household, the 
construction of financial responsibilities as male and financial dependence as female, 
domestic authority as male and domestic subservience as female, inevitably resonated 
in the world outside the domestic sphere.”). 
116. See Abd Al-Hamid Mayhoub, Scope in Islamic Law for Women Judges, in WOMEN 
JUDGES IN THE ARAB REGION: POINT, COUNTERPOINT, supra note 88, at 43, 45. 
117. See id. 
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The pre-modern jurists also relied on Quranic text to assert 
the “Testimony Argument.” In doing so, they cite to a singular 
verse118 distinguishing male and female testimony in financial 
matters to assert more broadly that female testimony is tainted 
with disability.119 
As a result, particular gender hierarchies prevailed 
concerning testimony in court.120 Men were thought to be 
superior to women because their testimony was not regarded as 
equal.121 The jurists accepted female testimony in property cases 
but in the circumstance of conflicting evidence, some jurists 
opined that the testimony of two men was superior to that of a 
man and two women.122 By extension, the pre-modern jurists 
and a number of contemporary women’s rights detractors argue 
that women cannot preside over a court in which her testimony 
is not accepted.123 
Indeed, detractors have adopted an expansive reading of 
this singular verse to support patriarchal notions about female 
competency, valuation and intellect more generally. Illustrative 
                                                                                                             
118. See BADAWI, supra note 53, at 33–34; see also MUHAMMAD FAROOQ-I-AZAM 
MALIK, ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MEANING OF AL-QUR’AN 146–47 (2d ed. 1997) 
(“O believers! When you deal with each other in lending for a fixed period of time, put 
it in writing. Let a scribe write it down with justice between the parties. The scribe, who 
is given the gift of literacy by Allah, should not refuse to write; he is under obligation to 
write. Let him who incurs the liability (debtor) dictate, fearing Allah his Rabb and not 
diminishing anything from the settlement. If the borrower is mentally unsound or weak 
or is unable to dictate himself, let the guardian of his interests dictate for him with 
justice. Let two witnesses from among you bear witness to all such documents, if two men cannot 
be found, then one man and two women of your choice should bear witness, so that if one of the 
women forgets anything the other may remind her. The witnesses must not refuse when they 
are called upon to do so. You must not be averse to writing (your contract) for a future 
period, whether it is a small matter or big. This action is more just for you in the sight 
of Allah, because it facilitates the establishment of evidence and is the best way to 
remove all doubts; but if it is a common commercial transaction concluded on the spot 
among yourselves, there is no blame on you if you do not put it in writing. You should 
have witnesses when you make commercial transactions. Let no harm be done to the 
scribe or witnesses; and if you do so, you shall be guilty of transgression. Fear Allah; it is 
Allah that teaches you and Allah has knowledge of everything.” (emphasis added)). 
119. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 143–44. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. 
123. See, e.g., Nasrawi, supra note 3 (“As for the law, many of Lashin’s opponents 
base their arguments on the Koran, the Muslim holy book. It stipulates that two women 
are equal to one man if they are called as witnesses in a court. So, by analogy, they say, a 
woman cannot be a judge as long as she cannot be a witness by herself.”). 
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are the reformed legal codes of Jordan, Libya, and Yemen, 
where a valid marriage contract requires proper witnesses—
either two men or one man and two women.124 The Quranic 
verse in question pertains to financial transactions. 
Pursuant to the “Nature Argument,” women’s judicial 
exclusion is justified on account of an emotional nature that 
renders them incapable of judicial administration in an 
objective and decisive manner.125 
Relatedly, the “Physiological Differences Argument” 
renders women unqualified for judicial posts due to various 
aspects of their physiology. First, judicial administration may 
cause preventable injury to an unborn child and/or the 
expectant mother.126 Second, maternity leave will cause undue 
delays to the court’s administration.127 Third, women are unfit to 
hold judicial office because menstruation symptoms leave them 
“nervous, unstable, and prone to sudden changes.”128 
                                                                                                             
124. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 167 (“And, in some circles, the notion that 
women make poor witnesses because of sex-linked mental deficiencies has yet to die 
out. Abou El Fadl cites a fatwa delivered by the Saudi jurist Ibn Baz in 1990, as part of 
his work with the Permanent Council for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions, 
which discusses the issue of female witnessing, and particularly the requirement for two 
female witnesses in the place of one male, in the following terms: ‘Thus, the Prophet 
explained that their [women’s] intellectual deficiency is in the fact that their memory is 
weak, and that their testimony needs the corroboration of another woman.’ Abou El 
Fadl is also careful to note that the Council is an official body and its fatwas carry real 
weight in the Saudi legal system.”). 
125. See Hanim Muhammad Hassan, Women Assuming Judgeships in Islamic 
Jurisprudence and Egyptian and International Law, in WOMEN JUDGES IN THE ARAB 
REGION: POINT, COUNTERPOINT, supra note 88, at 11, 12; Fawzi, supra note 88, at 26 (in 
connection to a survey on Muslim women judges: “The conditions stipulated by the 
respondents differed, yet most of them indicated a lack of confidence in the ability of 
women to fulfill such a role, thus agreeing with those who completely refused the issue. 
Among these conditions were the necessity of female judges being decisive, wise, not 
changing decisions, and not allowing emotions to rule decisions. Others stipulated that 
someone must assist female judges in making decisions, and that they may not issue a 
judgment until after they have discussed the case with others.”). 
126. See Hassan, supra note 125, at 13. 
127. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 29. 
128. See id. (“This conception of women’s deficiencies was expressed by one of 
the Islamic leaders in the fifties when he said, ‘from a realistic point of view, a judge 
must be committed to work throughout the year and may be granted only a limited 
number of weeks vacation in the summer. If a woman were to be a judge or a 
prosecuting attorney, what would she do about menstruation, which takes a week of 
every month? Everyone knows the weak psychological state of women during 
menstruation. What would she do if the disturbances of pregnancy in its final months 
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The “No Positions of Authority Argument” characterizes 
judgeships as a form of public authority for which women are 
unqualified.129 One particular Hadith is commonly cited as 
evidentiary support: “Abu Bakr attested, ‘when the Prophet, 
PBUH, learned that the Persians were ruled by a princess he 
said, ‘those who appoint a woman over them will not 
succeed.’”130 
The principle thus derived is a general prohibition against 
women assuming positions of sovereign power, and the judiciary 
is viewed as an extension of such power.131 Women’s rights 
detractors accuse women holding such authority with 
committing a sin.132 
The following sentiment is illustrative of the “Misogynist, 
anti-Education Argument”: 
What would Ibn al-Thayna’ [e.g. premodern jurist] say were 
he to know that the notion of women occupying judgeships 
was being discussed? In his work known as ‘the correctness 
of prohibiting women from writing’ he said, ‘As for teaching 
women reading and writing, God forbid, I see nothing more 
dangerous for them. They are predisposed to treachery and 
thus for them to obtain this talent would be for them to 
obtain the greatest means of evil and corruption. As soon as 
women are able to compose in writing, there would be a 
letter to Zayd and a note to Amr and a line of poetry to Azab 
and something else to another man. Women and writing is 
like an evil man given a sword, or a drunkard who is given a 
bottle of spirits. Men who keep their wives in a state of 
ignorance and blindness are sensible, as this is more suitable 
for them and more useful.’133 
Here, preserving a woman’s chastity and honor is directly linked 
to stymying educational and professional achievement.134 
The “Protectionist Argument” reasons the exclusion of 
women from the judiciary helps preserve their dignitary and 
                                                                                                             
darken her mood and wear out her nerves and thus she becomes ill-tempered and unfit 
for the serious trusteeship of the judiciary?”). 
129. See Mayhoub, supra note 116, at 43. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. at 44. 
133. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 21. 
134. See id. 
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reputational interests against base, immoral men.135 Further, the 
“Deficient Intellect Argument” views women as intellectually 
inferior AND, thus, inherently incapable of fulfilling judicial 
functions.136 Finally, two additional arguments revolve around 
women’s alleged inability to issue the death penalty in criminal 
matters and cultural exceptionalism (e.g. distinguishing it from 
other cultures where female judges have flourished).137 
B. The Rights Empowering Stance 
It is interesting to note that the rights empowering 
arguments in favor of female judges often represent 
counterarguments to those set forth above. For instance, gender 
rights proponents counter the “Nature Argument,” by re-
characterizing women’s emotional state as an attribute.138 Rather 
than challenge the false assumption underlying the argument 
(i.e., all women are inherently emotional), they give it further 
credence by asserting that women’s innate nature enhances 
their adjudicatory potential because they are more likely to give 
due regard to all humane considerations.139 
Another strand of the Nature counterargument asserts 
judges are bound by the Rule of Law and, where flouted, higher 
tribunals may review and rectify lower court decisions 
accordingly.140 This procedural mechanism encourages judges to 
adhere to legal precedents, doctrines and texts.141 With respect 
to women’s physiology, proponents challenge the menstruation 
                                                                                                             
135. See Mayhoub, supra note 116, at 44. 
136. See id. The following sentiment is illustrative of the lack of intellect argument: 
“Furthermore, the judiciary demands full thought and mental awareness. Women are 
not fully capable of this, and are too weak to arrive at a decision of refusal or defense, 
or face the problems and difficulties of judging with sureness and composition. Women 
are considered to be lacking in religion and intellect.” Id. 
137. See id. According to the cultural exceptionalism argument, proponents assert 
their society has its own special customs and values. 
138. See Hassan, supra note 125, at 12. 
139. See id. Essentially, they argue the following: “Emotion refines the senses and 
sensibilities and increases a perception of fairness. Judging in lawsuits does not require 
that the judge be hardened or oppress emotions and disregard humane considerations. 
Legislators often pay heed to such considerations when determining legislative texts, 
taking into consideration extenuating circumstances and extreme circumstances.” Id. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
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myth by characterizing it as a temporary state while citing to a 
variety of diseases and illnesses that may afflict sitting judges.142 
Significantly, gender rights advocates also leverage rights 
empowered Quranic interpretations.143 They promote equal 
participation, collaboration, and contribution in the public 
sphere144 by citing to gender equitable Quranic verses.145 
                                                                                                             
142. See id. at 13 (“If this opinion were sound, women would not be fit for any 
kind of work at all.”). 
143. See BADAWI, supra note 53, at 9–10 (“The Quran states, ‘And their Lord has 
accepted of them and answered them: ‘Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of 
you, be he/she male or female: you are members one of another . . .’  (Quran 3:195); 
‘If any do deeds of righteousness, be they male or female, and have faith, they will 
enter paradise and not the least injustice will be done to them.’ (Quran 4:124); ‘For 
Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for devout men and women, 
for true men and women, for men and women who are patient and constant, for men 
and woman who humble themselves, for men and women who give in charity, for men 
and women who fast (and deny themselves), for men and women who guard their 
chastity, and for men and women who engage much in Allah’s praise — for them has 
Allah prepared forgiveness and great reward.’ (Quran 33:35); ‘One Day you shall see 
the believing men and the believing women, how their Light runs forward before them 
and by their right hands. (Their greeting will be): ‘Good News for you this Day! 
Gardens beneath which flow rivers! To dwell therein forever! This is indeed the highest 
Achievement!’ (Quran 57:12).”). 
144. See id. at 37 (quoting the Quran as stating: “The believers, men and women, 
are protectors, one of another: they enjoin what is just and forbid what is evil: they 
observe regular prayers, practice regular charity and obey Allah and His apostle. On 
them will Allah pour His mercy; for Allah is Exalted in power, Wise.” (Quran 9:7)). 
145. See id. at 11 (noting that these proponents argue that the Quran is quite clear 
about the issue of the claimed superiority or inferiority of any human, male or female, 
and quoting the Quran: “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male 
and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other. 
Verily the most honored of you in the sight of God is (one who is) the most righteous 
of you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things).” (Quran 
49:13). Further, variations in gender, languages, and ethnic backgrounds and by 
implication, religious claims, do not provide any basis for superiority or inferiority. The 
implication of “that you may know each other” (Quran 49:13) is that such variations 
constitute a deliberate mosaic that God created, which is more interesting and more 
beautiful than a single “color” or a “unisex”. There is a clear categorical statement that 
the most honored person in the sight of God is the one who is most pious and 
righteous. This precludes any other basis for superiority, including gender. See BADAWI, 
supra note 54. They observe that the verse states that all human beings are created min 
thakarin wa-untha, which can be translated literally as “of male and female”. This 
means in pairs, as the Quran explicitly mentions elsewhere (e.g. 78:8). Each 
component of the pair is as necessary and as important as the other and hence is equal 
to him or her. The wording of this verse has been commonly translated also as “from a 
(single pair of) a male and a female,” referring to Adam and Eve. This serves as a 
reminder to all that they belong to the same family, with one common set of parents. As 
such they are all equal, as brothers and sisters in that broad and “very extended” 
family.”). 
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Further, they point to the Quran’s silence concerning judicial 
appointments, qualifications, or responsibilities.146 In absence of 
an explicit prohibition against female judges—and in light of 
the Islamic legal maxim that all things are permitted except 
what is expressly forbidden—they argue in favor of legal 
permissibility.147 
These proponents also challenge the legitimacy of rights 
restrictive interpretations of the Quran, seeking to recast the 
verses in a new interpretative light.148 Further, they argue that 
traditional understandings of the Quran rendering men as 
leaders in the household should not be extended to the political 
or legal spheres.149 
As to the alleged disability tainting female witness 
testimony, gender rights advocates claim that related Quranic 
references are largely gender neutral.150 There is one Quranic 
                                                                                                             
146. See KAMALI, supra note 12, at 31; see also Fawzi, supra note 88, at 22 (“[He] 
drew his conclusions from the saying of God Almighty, ‘God commands you to deliver 
trusts back to their owners; and when you judge between the people, that you judge 
with justice.’ (Surat al-Nisaa’, Verse 58) This discourse is directed at men, women, 
slaves, and freemen, for the religion is one.”). 
147. See KAMALI, supra note 12, at 31 (“Others maintain that where the Quran sets 
forth general principles, it is the Islamic scholars’ responsibility to organize state affairs, 
including details surrounding the judiciary, in accordance with time and circumstance. 
Similarly it is also argued that no jurist is able to point to an explicit text in the Quran 
that categorically excludes women from any lawful type of employment, including the 
judiciary. Similarly it is also argued that no jurist is able to point to an explicit text in 
the Quran that categorically excludes women from any lawful type of employment, 
including the judiciary.”). 
148. See, e.g., BADAWI, supra note 53. For instance, the Quran is frequently cited to 
support the proposition that men are superior to women. With regard to the verse 
quoted in its entirety above, proponents argue that nowhere does the Quran state that 
one gender is superior to the other. Some interpreters of the Quran mistakenly 
translate the Arabic word qiwamah (responsibility for the family) to the English word 
“superiority.” The Quran makes it clear that the sole basis for superiority of any person 
over another is piety and righteousness, not gender, color, or nationality. 
149. See id. at 38 (with respect to female leadership: “some may argue that 
according to the Quran (4:34), men are the protectors and maintainers of women. 
Such a leadership position (responsibility, or qiwamah) for men in the family unit 
implies their exclusive leadership in political life as well. This analogy, however, is far 
from conclusive. Qiwamah deals with the particularity of family life and the need for 
financial arrangements, role differentiation, and complementarity of the roles of 
husband and wife (some scholars even contest this interpretation). These particularities 
are not necessarily the same as the head of state.”). 
150. See id. at 33–34 (“And for those who launch a charge against their spouses 
and have (in support) no evidence but their own, their solitary evidence (can be 
received) if they bear witness four times (with an oath) by Allah that they are solemnly 
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verse, however, that equates the testimony of two women to a 
single male in financial matters.151 Gender rights advocates 
counter that the verse must be understood in proper historical 
context.152 Whereas women were not familiar with complex 
financial transactions due to lack of female participation in that 
area some 1500 years ago,153 this is no longer the reality.154 The 
underlying assumption concerning women’s deficient financial 
                                                                                                             
telling the truth; And the fifth (oath) (should be) that they solemnly invoke the curse 
of Allah on themselves if they tell a lie. But it would avert the punishment from the wife 
if she bears witness four times (with an oath) by Allah that (her husband) is telling a 
lie; And the fifth (oath) should be that she solemnly invokes the wrath of Allah on 
herself if (her accuser) is telling the truth (Quran 24:6-9).”). 
151. See id. at 34–35 (quoting the Quran as stating: “O you who believe! When you 
deal with each other in transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of 
time, reduce them to writing. Let a scribe write down faithfully as between the parties: 
Let not the scribe refuse to write: as Allah has taught him, so let him write. Let him who 
incurs the liability dictate, but let him fear his Lord, Allah, and not diminish aught of 
what he owes. If the party liable is mentally deficient, or weak, or unable himself to 
dictate, let his guardian dictate faithfully. And get two witnesses out of your own men, 
and if there are not two men, then a man and two women, such as you choose for 
witnesses so that if one of them errs, the other can remind her. The witnesses should 
not refuse when they are called on (for evidence). Disdain not to reduce to writing 
(your contract) for a future period, whether it be small or big: it is more just in the 
sight of Allah, more suitable as evidence, and more convenient to prevent doubts 
among yourselves, but if it be a transaction which you carry out on the spot among 
yourselves, there is no blame on you if you reduce it not to writing. But take witnesses 
whenever you make a commercial contract; and let neither scribe nor witness suffer 
harm. If you do (such harm), it would be wickedness in you. So fear Allah; for it is Allah 
that teaches you. And Allah is well acquainted with all things (Quran 2:282).”). 
152. See ALI, supra note 94, at xxvi (“In engaging with Muslim texts of the past, it 
is important to consider the ways in which their authors’ base assumptions differ from 
those of the present.”). 
153. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 142 (“[This view seems to be buttressed by the 
fact that the Sunni] jurists recognized that there were certain legally relevant facts that 
were likely to be known by women alone, such as matters related to childbirth. 
Establishing the paternity of the child by fixing the date of its birth, or ascertaining 
whether a baby were stillborn or had lived at least briefly outside the womb, had 
implications for inheritance and other legal claims. Although the jurists differed as to 
how many witnesses were required in these cases – Hanafis were satisfied with one or 
two and Shafi’is insisted on four – they all acknowledged that female testimony alone 
provided sufficient evidence, often citing a hadith narrative for support.”). 
154. See Hassan, supra note 125, at 17 (“Rather as Shaykh Muhammad Abdu said, 
it is not among the concerns of women to deal with finances and the like in terms of 
compensation. Thus, women’s memory is weak in this regard [because it is presumed 
she is not familiar with finances] unlike their memory concerning household matters 
which is their field of work and for which their memory is better than men’s. It is 
human nature to have a strong memory in matters of concern in which one is active. 
The Shaykh added that there are cases in which the sole witness of women are 
accepted.”). 
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expertise no longer holds true—thus, as historical context 
evolves, so should the formula for male and female witnesses.155 
Indeed, the testimony of a female graduate of the Wharton 
business school is arguably more credible than that of an 
illiterate male with no such credentials.156 
In addition, gender rights proponents challenge the 
Testimony Argument by citing to historical female roles as 
transmitters of the Prophet Muhammad’s statements as set forth 
in the Hadith literature.157 Significantly, hadith transmission and 
court testimony both involve the conveying of factual events thus 
undermining assertions concerning female disability in 
testimony.158 
It is significant to note that the Shii outlook on female 
testimony, dominant in Iran, appears to be more expansive, 
                                                                                                             
155. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 162 (“By the late twentieth century, an eminent 
Islamic jurist could make this argument in a very explicit fashion, stating that the 
requirement that a female witness ‘be reminded’ by another woman could fade away, 
because ‘once society passes beyond that stage and women are allowed to participate 
more fully in its affairs, and in transactions in particular, there should no longer be a 
need for such arrangements.’”(quoting Taha J. al-’Alwani, The Testimony of Women in 
Islamic Law, 13 AM. J. ISLAMIC SOC. SCI. 173, 174 (1996)). 
156. See id. at 159–61. (“The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
reformist jurists engaged these questions of the female legal subject with an eye to 
explaining, and minimizing, the differences between men and women as legal actors. . . 
The reformers wrestled with the Qur’anic formula of two women to one man and the 
implications it held for female competency. Both Rida and al-Haddad took the position 
that the Qur’anic verse 2:282 was not a pronouncement on the limitations of Woman as 
a legal or moral subject, but rather a recognition of certain anthropological realities 
bounded in space and time. Al-Haddad cited her lack of instruction and her 
inexperience in business matters at the time of the revelation as key to the correct 
interpretation of the verse. Rida concurred, and leveled criticism at those interpreters 
who hold that women are liable to err or forget because of defects in rationality and 
religion or their innate temperament. Rather, according to Rida, it was their lack of 
familiarity with business transactions that affected their memory, because it is in the 
nature of human beings to remember details of those things with which they are most 
familiar.”). 
157. See Al Bayoumi Abdou Bayoumi, Islamic Law and Permissibility of Women Being 
Judges, in WOMEN JUDGES IN THE ARAB REGION: POINT, COUNTERPOINT, supra note 88, 
at 53, 56. 
158. See id.; see also SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 192 (“There is also unanimity 
that only women and never men can be witnesses for things men are not privy to, in 
particular childbirth and questions asked about women’s bodies which can be answered 
only if women examine other women ‘between the navel and the knee.’”). 
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permitting women to testify in a spectrum of cases ranging from 
debt collection to criminal matters.159 
Sunni Islamic law and normative Muslim practices are also 
informed by historical precedents from the faith’s formative 
period, as previously noted above. Following the demise of the 
Prophet Muhammad, four men who were closely associated with 
him—Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthman, and Ali—led the 
Muslim community successively.160 Commonly referenced as the 
“rightly guided caliphs,”161 their conduct is often cited as 
instructive, including on matters related to proper Muslim 
female roles.162 These and other precedents163 are frequently 
leveraged by women’s rights activists to counter adverse 
narratives negating female authority.164 Particularly illustrative is 
Umar ibn Al-Khattab’s appointment of a woman, Al-Shifaa, to 
oversee the marketplace and guard consumers against unsavory 
business practices.165 In fact, she was so successful in her post 
that he appointed another woman, Samra bint Nahik Al-Asadiya, 
                                                                                                             
159. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 142 (“Some Shi’a were also open to the 
possibility that women could testify in all kinds of cases, including hudūd cases, 
although some of the penalties might be reduced if the case rested on a plurality of 
female witnesses.”). 
160. See SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 5. 
161. Rightly Guided Caliphs, OXFORDREFERENCE.COM, http://www.oxford
reference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195305135.001.0001/acref-9780195305135-e-
0687 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
162. See SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 5. 
163. See CLINTON BENNETT, MUSLIM WOMEN OF POWER: GENDER, POLITICS AND 
CULTURE IN ISLAM 39 (2010) (“In The Forgotten Queens of Islam (1993), Mernissi set out 
to show that Muslim women had in fact occupied positions of power before Benazir. 
The stories of these women go unsung, rubbed out ‘of official history.’ They are 
nonetheless available in ‘yellowed’ tomes. She recounts the stories of women who at 
times in Muslim history exercised power, often against the odds, sometimes through 
intrigue. As well as regents ruling for infant sons, there were women who ruled in their 
own right. The problem for men in contemporary times is that women’s entry into the 
public domain breaks convention, shattering the veil designed to separate them.” 
(citations omitted)). 
164. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 28 (“Slightly less than half the sample stated that 
there are no historical cases of women holding judgeships, and 16.6 affirmed that there 
have been. However, when they were asked to give examples most of them mentioned 
cases in which women played a military role or decreed a fatwa (the name of Aisha was 
oft repeated).”). 
165. See BADAWI, supra note 53, at 18–19. See generally WOMEN JUDGES IN THE ARAB 
REGION: POINT, COUNTERPOINT, supra note 88. 
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to serve in a similar capacity in a distinct jurisdiction.166 These 
precedents belie the notion that women cannot effectively serve 
in positions of public authority. 
In addition to serving in such administrative positions, 
Muslim women also participated in the selection of political 
leaders, legislation, scholarship and instruction, and on the 
battlefield.167 Gender rights advocates leverage such historical 
precedents to undermine narratives concerning the lack of 
propriety of women serving in positions of authority,168 and 
more specifically, administering justice from the bench.169 
Related, gender rights advocates have employed the “Mufti 
Argument” referring to historical Muslim women roles as Muftis 
who played a critical role in judicial administration. In her 
capacity as Mufti, she collected relevant information, engaged in 
analogical reasoning and analysis, and rendered an appropriate 
ruling.170 As depicted above, the Mufti’s legal opinions were 
frequently dispositive of a case’s outcome.171 Leveraging such 
historical precedent, advocates question the logic underlying 
arguments against female judges who convey decisions in a 
similar manner to the Mufti.172 
                                                                                                             
166. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 23; see also, Gretel C. Kovach, After 50 Year Fight, 
Women Get the Gavel, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 7, 2003, http://
www.csmonitor.com/2003/0107/p01s03-wome.html (“These days, the Brotherhood is 
sponsoring female candidates for parliament, as long as they’re veiled, and Egyptians 
are using Islam to argue for the expansion of women’s rights, citing role models like 
the woman appointed judge by the second Caliph Omar Ibn Khattab.”). 
167. See BADAWI, supra note 53, at 32. (“The near or total seclusion of women is 
alien to the prophetic period. Interpretative problems in justifying seclusion reflect, in 
part, cultural influences and circumstances in different Muslim countries. There is 
ample evidence in authentic (sound) hadith supporting this thesis. Women at the 
Prophet’s time and after him participated with men in acts of worship, such as prayers 
and pilgrimage, in learning and teaching, in the market place, in the discussion of 
public issues (political life) and in the battlefield when necessary.”). 
168. See id. at 38–39. (“Most arguments for exclusion, however, are based on the 
following hadith narrated by Abu Bakrah: ‘During the battle of Al-Jamal (in which 
A’isha, the Prophet’s widow, led an army in opposition to Ali, the fourth Caliph), Allah 
benefitted me with a word. When the Prophet heard the news that the people of Persia 
had made the daughter of Khosrau their queen (ruler), he said, “Never will such a 
nation succeed as makes a woman their ruler.”’). 
169. See Bayoumi, supra note 157, at 56. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. 
172. See generally WOMEN JUDGES IN THE ARAB REGION: POINT, COUNTERPOINT, 
supra note 88. 
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Advocates also rely on egalitarian Hadith narrations to 
counter restrictive sentiments seemingly grounded in religious 
ideology.173 With regard to the Hadith prohibiting female 
leadership, gender rights proponents174 question its authenticity 
and broad application while asserting that it does not represent 
a categorical exclusion of women to leadership positions.175 
                                                                                                             
173. See BADAWI, supra note 54, at 30–31. Note how this hadith is ignored but 
others used to detract from women’s rights: “According to Prophet Muhammad’s (P) 
saying, ‘Women are but sisters (shaqa’iq, or twin halves) of men.’ This hadith is a 
profound statement that directly relates to the issue of human equality between the 
genders. If the first meaning of shaqa’iq is adopted, it means that a male is worth one 
half of society with the female worth the other half. Can ‘one half’ be better or bigger 
than the other half? Is there a more simple but profound physical image of equality? If 
the second meaning, ‘sisters,’ is adopted, it implies the same. The term “sister” is 
different from ‘slave’ or ‘master.’[] Prophet Muhammad (P) taught kindness, care and 
respect toward women in general (‘I commend you to be kind to women’). It is 
significant that such instruction of the Prophet (P) was among his final instructions 
and reminders in the ‘farewell pilgrimage’ address given shortly before his passing 
away.” Id. 
174. See BENNETT, supra note 163, at 38. (“Turning to a detailed study of what she 
calls the ‘conversation stopper’—the hadith that no people prosper who entrust their 
affairs to a woman—cited when Benazir was running for office, Mernissi notes how this 
was suddenly remembered after Ayesha’s failed coup against Ali in 656. The fact that a 
woman had led what was regarded as the first fitna (civil war) gave men an excuse to 
speculate that female leadership results in chaos. Hadith were often invented to add 
authority to men’s opinions. Mernissi suggests that this is exactly what Abu Bakra, the 
narrator did. Ayesha was pardoned, remaining an honored mother of the believers. 
Women, though, were discouraged from taking part in public life, secluded, and 
reserved for domestic, child-rearing duties. Mernissi argues that this departed from 
earlier tradition when Muhammad consulted women and preached gender equality. 
His wives’ advice was often the deciding factor in ‘thorny negotiations’. It was after his 
death that misogyny ‘very quickly reasserted itself’. She writes of Muhammad’s time as 
one in which women ‘had their place as unquestioned partners in a revolution that 
made the mosque an open place and the household a temple of debate’. No few hadith 
express Muhammad’s fondness for women, such as ‘paradise lies at the feet of a 
mother.” (footnotes omitted)). 
175. See BADAWI, supra note 53, at 39 (“While this hadith has been commonly 
interpreted to exclude women from the headship of state, other scholars do not agree 
with that interpretation. The Persian rulers at the time of the Prophet (P) showed 
enmity toward the Prophet (P) and toward his messenger to them. The Prophet’s 
response to this news may have been a statement about the impending doom of that 
unjust empire, which did take place later and not about the issue of gender as it relates 
to headship of the state itself. Z. Al-Qasimi argues that one of the rules of interpretation 
known to Muslim scholars is that there are cases in which the determining factor in 
interpretation is the specificity of the occasion (of the hadith) and not the generality of 
the wording. Even if the generality of its wording is to be accepted, that does not 
necessarily mean that a general rule is applicable, categorically, to any situation. As 
such, the hadith is not conclusive evidence of categorical exclusion.”). 
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In addressing the dominant view of the Islamic schools of 
law, gender rights advocates attempt to distinguish the primary 
sources of law from the legal opinions subsequently derived 
from them.176 Specifically, advocates argue that the act of 
legislating is a fallible process influenced by time, circumstance, 
and culture.177 As such, the classical jurists’ rights restrictive pre-
modern opinions should not enjoy finality or Divine 
reverence.178 
Still others point to those pre-modern jurists, albeit 
comprising a minority dissent, who opined that women could 
render authoritative opinions from the bench.179 
                                                                                                             
176. See id. at 45–46 (“Scholars should not continue to quote and repeat some of 
the long-standing juristic interpretations as if they were equal in authority and finality 
to the two primary sources of Islam. Nor should they engage in a fragmentary and 
selective approach in seeking justification of the erroneous status quo. They should 
realize that even the greatest of jurists are fallible humans, whose interpretations have 
been affected by the culture and circumstances under which they have lived. With the 
host of pressing and significant contemporary issues, a fresh ijtihad (interpretation) is 
needed.”); see also SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 3. 
177. See BADAWI, supra note 53, at 3; see also SPECTORSKY, supra note 11, at 14 (“‘It 
is also indispensable for the fiqh as a learned discipline whose inner cohesion can only 
be guaranteed through the acknowledgment that while all scholars and schools of fiqh 
equally derive their norms from the revelation, no scholar’s and no school’s normative 
interpretation of the revelation can claim a privileged access to truth. All scholars and 
schools of fiqh share in the same activity: probable, but fallible interpretation of 
infallible texts.’” (quoting BABER JOHANSEN, CONTINGENCY IN A SACRED LAW: LEGAL 
AND ETHICAL NORMS IN THE MUSLIM FIQH 37 (1998)). 
178. See BADAWI, supra note 53, at 2. 
179. See HALLAQ, supra note 12, at 342 & n.3 (“Abū Hanīfa held the opinion that 
women can serve in this capacity in all areas of the law where their testimony is deemed 
valid, namely, in all areas except hudūd offenses and qisās. The eponym of the defunct 
Jarīrite school, Ibn Jarīr, reasoned that because women can exercise ijtihād like men, 
they can serve as judges in the entire gamut of the law . . . . The prescriptions extend 
from personal characteristics and state of mind to the procedure he must follow in his 
court, all of which, as always, are subject to the multiplicity of legal opinion.”); BADAWI, 
supra note 53, at 18. (“[T]here is no restriction on benefitting from women’s talents in 
any field. Some early jurists, such as Abu-Hanifah and Al-Tabari, uphold that a qualified 
Muslim woman may be appointed to the position of a judge. Other jurists hold 
different opinions.”); Mayhoub, supra note 116, at 42; Fawzi, supra note 88, at 22–23 
(“Reviewing the requisite specifications of a judge according to Ibn Taymiyya, we find 
that a judge must be ‘pious and a possessor of three essential traits; a witness for the 
prosecution, a definer of supreme authority, and having jurisdiction in compulsion. 
The provisions of the judiciary are considered based on faculty, and it must be 
entrusted with the most ideal, as indicated by Ahmed and others. The most useful and 
least evil of the unrighteous, and the most just of the imitators and most knowledgeable 
of tradition should be appointed over others. If one is more knowledgeable and the 
other more pious, the pious will fear the abyss and the knowledgeable will fear 
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Gender rights advocates also forward the “Necessity 
Argument,” explaining that economic, political, legal, and 
cultural necessity dictates female participation in the public 
square.180 Women in the workforce, including as judges, 
alleviates economic hardship confronting many struggling 
families.181 Facilitating their ability to make meaningful 
contributions, they argue, also enhances women’s cultural and 
social stature.182 Additionally, they state, female participation on 
the bench may positively advance judicial administration in a 
number of states that suffer from a dearth of qualified arbiters 
and a daunting backlog of cases.183 Finally, advocates also rely on 
women’s professional accomplishments in a spectrum of 
additional fields to question stymied female advancement in the 
administration of justice.184 
III. APPROACHES IN INDONESIA, EGYPT, AND IRAN 
Religion continues to represent a powerful, influential 
force on law and society, albeit to varying positive and negative 
                                                                                                             
misgiving.’ Reviewing these stipulations we find that he did not mention that a judge 
must be male. . . . Shaykh Muhammad Al-Ghazali [] affirmed in his book, ‘Sunna: 
Between Jurisprudence and Hadith,’ that women are able to hold any position they 
have qualifications for with the exception of the Caliphate.”). 
180. See Hassan, supra note 125, at 11. 
181. See id. (“Women’s participation in the workforce is an economic necessity 
due to increasing rise of economic burdens. If women did not share these burdens with 
men, families would not be able to realize their dreams and raise the material standard 
of their life, rather, they would drown in debt.”). 
182. See id. 
183. See id. at 12. 
184. See id. at 13 (“Some hold that the administration of justice is a form of public 
authority, and there is a consensus among the Islamic legists that women are not 
qualified to hold public authority. In this case, authority is known as a power that allows 
its owner to issue orders to individuals by individual will. In addition to this form of 
public authority are considered to include legislation of positive law, and work in 
representative councils. Women have become representatives in the representative 
councils and have even headed committees . . . . As women issue legislation, is it ration 
to prohibit them from applying it themselves were they to assume judgeships? Women 
have also held posts in ministries . . . . The ministries are considered an authority, as 
they vest power to issue orders and declarations by individual will and may make 
allowances or prohibit as it sees fit. Women have also headed the administration of 
disciplinary cases, which is another public power. In this capacity, women have 
individually issued a resolution for people to be transferred to the disciplinary 
courts.”). 
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degrees, in the Muslim world.185 This Section surveys religious, 
social, and political factors impacting women’s ascension to the 
bench in Indonesia and Egypt, as well as her demotion from it 
in Iran. 
A. Indonesia 
Indonesia is the most populous Muslim majority country in 
the world, with an ethnically186 and religiously diverse 
population.187 It inherited the ‘civil law’ system characteristic of 
European countries from the Dutch,188 its prior colonizing 
power.189 Notably, its tripartite legal system is comprised of 
statutory law, customary law (“adat”),190 and Islamic law.191 This 
legal pluralism informs its federal constitution,192 and manifests 
within its judiciary as well.193 
                                                                                                             
185. See Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Balancing Islam, Adat and the State: 
Comparing Islamic and Civil Courts in Indonesia, in THE POWER OF LAW IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL WORLD: ANTHROPOLOGICAL ENQUIRIES 216, 216–17 (Franz Von 
Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2009). 
186. See Tim Lindsey, An Overview of Indonesian Law, in INDONESIA: LAW AND 
SOCIETY 1, 2 (Timothy Lindsey ed., 1999) (“Indonesian society has long been made up 
of a diverse range of ethnic groups. Some observers argue that as many as 300 discrete 
cultures can still be identified although most scholars agree that they can be grouped 
into 19 main categories.”(internal citations omitted)). 
187. See Benda-Beckmann, supra note 185, at 216–17. 
188. See Lindsey, supra note 186, at 4. The archipelago was also occupied by the 
Japanese from 1942 to 1945; they modified the pre-existing colonial legal system only 
slightly to avert social chaos from erupting. Id. 
189. See id. at 1 (“[T]he development of modern Indonesian law [can be] divided 
into four periods: . . . the ‘traditional’ period (up to the early 19th century); the ‘ 
colonial’ period (from the early 19th century to 1945); the Old Order (from 1945 to 
March 1966); and the New Order, under Soeharto from March 1966 to 21 May 1998, 
when he resigned, to be replaced by his former deputy, President BJ Habibe.” 
(citations omitted)). 
190. See JOHN R. BOWEN, ISLAM, LAW AND EQUALITY IN INDONESIA: AN 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF PUBLIC REASONING 9 (2003). Adat consist of rules and practices of 
social life, a culturally appropriate sense of propriety, tradition and custom. Id. at 3–4. 
191. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 168–69. 
192. See Benda-Beckman, supra note 185, at 217. 
193. See id. (“Furthermore, Islamic law applies to marriage and divorce for the 
Muslim population, so Muslims have to go to an Islamic court for marriage and divorce 
disputes. The regulation of land is a complex of state law and adat, full of 
contradictions. For kinship and inheritance issues the state legal system leaves its 
population considerable freedom. Muslims have the choice of bringing their 
inheritance disputes to a civil or an Islamic court. Civil courts usually apply adat law in 
inheritance cases, while Islamic courts in principle have to apply Islamic law.”). 
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The Indonesian judicial system is unitary, consolidated,194 
and comprised of diverse sets of courts, including Islamic195 
courts.196 Its Supreme Court includes fifty-one justices and is 
organized by division, with jurisdiction over four distinct sets of 
courts: (a) regular courts, including appellate and trial courts, 
with civil and criminal jurisdiction; (b) Islamic courts with 
religious jurisdiction; (c) military courts; and (d) administrative 
courts with limited jurisdiction over government and agency 
disputes.197 
Notably, the structure of the religious courts was based 
directly on the secular model; they had a hierarchal appellate 
mechanism and adopted similar procedural rules.198 Indonesian 
courts suffer from low prestige,199 but remain reflective of this 
                                                                                                             
194. See David M. O’Brien, The Politics of Judicial Selection and Appointments in Japan 
and Ten South and Southeast Asian Countries, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF 
JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 355, 367–68 (Kate 
Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). 
195. See Hooker, supra note 108, at 34–35 (“The colonial Religious Court System 
was the main legacy of the Dutch. In 1882, they promulgated the first regulation 
concerning the Colonial Religious Court system. The law, revised in 1937, established 
Religious Courts in Java, Madura, Banjarmasin and associated areas of southern 
Borneo. In 1957, the Indonesian Government promulgated regulations extending the 
system to the whole archipelago. These regulations constituted the Religious Court 
system until the reforms of 1989. . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
196. See Benda-Beckmann, supra note 185, at 217. 
197. See O’Brien, supra note 194, at 367–68; LEGAL & JUDICIAL RESEARCH CTR. OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDON., JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF INDONESIA 4 (2003); see also Euis 
Nurlaelawati & Abdurrahman Rahim, The Training, Appointment, and Supervision of 
Islamic Judges in Indonesia, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 43, 58 (2012) (“Significant changes 
in both the institutional and juridical supervision of the Islamic courts began to be 
introduced at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1970, the government issued a new Basic 
Act on Judicial Power. Article 10 of the act defines the structure of the Indonesian 
judiciary. The Article first states that judicial power is to be exercised by four types of 
courts: general courts, Islamic courts, military courts, and administrative courts. The 
Article next states that the Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in the 
country and, as such, has the power to review decisions from the highest appellate 
authority within all four systems. This language is significant for two reasons. On the 
one hand, the Law strengthens the legal status of the Islamic courts since it constitutes 
the first statutory recognition of Islamic tribunals since colonial times. However, the 
1970 Law also undermines the authority of the Ministry of Religion with respect to the 
Islamic courts because it vests appellate authority over Islamic tribunals in the Supreme 
Court.”(footnotes omitted)). 
198. See Hooker, supra note 108, at 35. 
199. See Anne Wallace & Leisha Lister, Accessing the Courts, 10 CANBERRA L. REV. 
30, 32 (2011) (“‘The Indonesian judicial system, has long suffered from a poor 
reputation.’ In 2007, the World Bank described it in the following terms: ‘Thirty years 
of political marginalization has left Indonesia’s legal institutions degraded and 
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balance between state, adat, and religion.200 Illustrative is the 
country’s 1989 Religious Judiciary Act expanding the Islamic 
courts’ jurisdiction and rendering them equal to the civil courts 
within the national legal system. 201 At its introduction, the Act 
was widely viewed as evidence of Islam’s increasingly influential 
legal prominence.202 
The federal government continued to issue a number of 
official regulations further expanding the Islamic court’s 
jurisdiction, culminating in the 1991 Compilation of Islamic Law 
encompassing all issues related to marriage and inheritance.203 
The enhanced role of the Islamic courts has prompted national 
legal discourse concerning the type of Islamic law that can and 
should be applied. 204 
                                                                                                             
ineffective. Rife with corruption and poorly resourced, the legal institutions suffer from 
a chronic lack of public trust.’”); see also Lindsey, supra note 186, at 7 (“[T]he President 
[] became the de facto source of legal legitimacy. His interference in the judicial 
process led to the judiciary being increasingly seen as a mere arm of the executive. The 
legal profession and in particular the judiciary, became degraded and demoralized.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
200. See Benda-Beckmann, supra note 185, at 217. 
201. See id. 
202. See id. 
203. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 169; see also Hooker, supra note 108, at 43. This 
1991 Compilation of Islamic Law is the most important document on shariah 
promulgated in modern Indonesia:  
The Compilation is not a Law[], but “a guide to applicable law for Judges 
within the jurisdiction of the Institutions of Religious Justice in solving the 
cases submitted to them.” Articles 3 and 4 of the Compilation’s explanatory 
memorandum or Elucidation—which like all the Elucidations that 
accompany laws in Indonesia should be read as part of the text of the law 
itself—appear to state what the “applicable law” is, by setting out the 
following sources for shariah: (a) standard texts of the Shafi mazhab, (b) 
additional texts from other mazhab, (c) existing yurisprudensi, (d) the fatwa of 
the ulama, and (e) “the situation in other countries” . . . . The compilation 
claims to be a summary of these sources for use by Religious Court judges, 
but seems to overlook the Kitah Kuning or “yellow books” which are the bases 
for the instruction in the Pesantren (local Islamic schools). 
Id. 
204. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 169 (“The notion that Indonesian society has a 
‘sense of justice’ that provides the foundation for basic gender equality in its legal 
systems, including the Islamic rules of inheritance, was developed by Indonesian jurists 
in the course of the 1950s and 1960s. Professor Hazairin of the University of Indonesia 
Law School ‘argued that Islamic inheritance law contains general and universal 
principles, notably the principle that both women and men inherit property, and also 
specific rules. These rules derive from the Arab culture within which early jurists wrote, 
and in a different time and place may be discarded . . . .’ Islamic inheritance rules 
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It is worth noting that Shafii is the prominent school of 
Islamic law in Indonesia; the school permits female judges when 
necessary.205 Notably, Indonesia is not an Islamic state (such as 
Iran), notwithstanding its overwhelming Muslim majority 
population and legal deference to the religion.206 Further, it has 
long enjoyed a reputation for a tolerant form of religious 
expression that is inclusive in orientation.207 Significantly, laws 
based upon Islamic principles also encompass references to the 
Indonesian ideology of Pancasila.208 Pancasila refers to principles 
upon which the Indonesian state is based, including the belief in 
a monotheistic God and a commitment to democracy.209 
Even in the world’s most populous Muslim-majority 
country, Muslims grapple to reconcile competing sets of social 
norms, religious laws, gender equitable concepts, and the rule of 
law.210 These struggles often play out in Islamic and civil courts 
alike where judges are forced to reconcile claims sounding in 
religion against those based on customary law or adat.211 Women 
frequently negotiate their property rights to acquire land in 
Islamic courts,212 and a number of gender equality challenges 
sound in new rights empowering interpretations of Islamic 
law.213 These proponents assert Islamic jurisprudence’s dynamic 
                                                                                                             
could therefore be brought into line with the prevailing Indonesian sense of justice and 
practices of gender equality inherent in much of the adat.”(footnotes omitted)). 
205. See Hooker, supra note 108, at 47 n.7. 
206. See Sebastiaan Pompe, Islamic Law in Indonesia, 4 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 
180, 186 (1997–1998). 
207. See id. at 180–81. 
208. See Hooker, supra note 108, at 39. 
209. See id. (“The principles of Pancasila most important to syariah are its first, a 
Belief in One Supreme God, and fourth, which embodies a commitment to democracy. 
For Muslims, the reference to God embodies the Qur’an and Sunna; however, the 
mention of democracy refers to a political system for which these sources provide no 
direct authority. There is of course an Indonesian dimension to these comments. 
Democracy can be ‘guided’, and the words of God, which is how we know Him, can be 
interpreted variously and through the ages.”). 
210. See BOWEN, supra note 190 at 3-4 (“Indonesia is the site of long-standing, 
diverse efforts to shape lives in an Islamic way, but also of even longer-standing and 
more diverse efforts to shape them according to local complexes of norms and 
traditions called adat, some 300-plus of them according to conventional calculations – 
and all this further complicated by shifting sensibilities regarding gender equality and 
the “rule of law.”). 
211. See id. at 6. 
212. See id. 
213. See id. at 8–9. 
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nature, characterizing it as an evolving effort to resolve disputes 
by drawing upon legal texts, logic, the public interest, and 
community consensus.214 Consequently, Indonesia’s judicial 
system continues to confront changing circumstances and 
challenges.215 
1. The Judiciary 
The civil law system of judicial selection as practiced by 
European countries has influenced the Indonesian process, 
including the recruitment of Islamic court judges.216 Whereas 
judges in common law jurisdictions are frequently accomplished 
attorneys, the judiciary represents a distinct career path in civil 
law systems. 217 
In Indonesia, judges are civil servants whom the Ministry of 
Justice selects, appoints, transfers, and promotes.218 Candidates 
                                                                                                             
214. See id. at 9 (“Recent studies by historians and anthropologists have 
highlighted Islamic legal reasoning as a set of social practices, moving away from older 
presentations of shari’a as a set of rules to take account of the social contexts within 
which jurists and others engage in interpretation and justification.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
215. See TUCKER, supra note 37, at 168, 170 (“In 2004, Musdah Mulia, the Director 
of Religious Research and Social Affairs at the Department of Religious Affairs and a 
well-known advocate for gender equality, headed up a working group for the 
department charged with reviewing the Islamic Law Compilation (ILC) of 1991. The 
resulting critique of the ILC focused on the ways in which it contradicted ‘universal 
basic principles of Islam’ as well as founding ideas of civil society including gender 
equality, and argued for a revision of the ILC based on Islamic sources and the norms 
of Indonesian society. The rules of classical ‘Arab’ fiqh, including inheritance rules, 
were developed in a different social and cultural space, one of patriarchy that distorted 
the original Islamic message of equality. A rereading of the texts in the spirit of this 
message, combined with attention to the traditions and conditions of present day 
Indonesians . . . .”). 
216. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 49 (“The system of judicial 
recruitment in Indonesia, including the recruitment of Islamic court judges, is very 
much influenced by the civil law system of recruitment applied by European 
continental states.”). 
217. See id. at 49–50. 
218. See O’Brien, supra note 194, at 367–68. The Ministry of Justice is part of the 
Executive Branch. “[U]ntil their appointments as full-time government employees, 
judicial recruits in Indonesia do not receive full or adequate state funding. Thus the 
judicial recruitment process works to disadvantage poor and middle-class candidates 
interested in pursuing a judicial career. Moreover, judicial recruitment in Indonesia is 
burdened by low prestige and salaries and inadequate court facilities, especially in rural 
areas. Furthermore, like other Indonesian civil servants, judges face civil service 
performance reviews and work under its direction for promotions and transfers. They 
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are generally new graduates with strong academic credentials, 
and at a minimum, a Bachelor of Arts degree in law.219 They are 
required to sit for a written and oral examination,220 and 
thereafter undergo a one-year judicial training program.221 
Upon successful completion of the program, they are assigned 
to a district court for additional in-service training as a court 
clerk prior to embarking upon their judicial careers.222 
In order to qualify for a judicial appointment to the Islamic 
Court, the candidate must have academic credentials 
demonstrating a mastery in Islamic law.223 Candidates must 
                                                                                                             
must retire at age fifty-five unless they are promoted to a high court or the Supreme 
Court, in which case they may retire at age sixty and sixty-five, respectively.” Id. 
219. See id. 
220. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 52 (“The oral exam includes a 
psychometric test developed by the University of Indonesia to assess the candidate’s 
fitness to serve as a judge, a ten-minute interview on issues related to the procedural 
and substantive law of the Islamic courts, and a test of the applicant’s ability to read and 
comprehend passages from fiqh texts dealing with legal issues. To complete the 
application, the applicant must also submit documentary proof that he or she is free 
from drug addiction, together with a letter from the local police.”). 
221. See O’Brien, supra note 194 at 367–68 (“They must then pass written and oral 
examinations before admission into a one-year program at the Ministry of Justice 
Education and Training Center.”); see also LEGAL & JUDICIAL RESEARCH CTR. OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF INDON, supra note 197, at 18–19 (“The law graduates will enter the 
annual examination held by the Department of Justice. The examination is focused on 
adequate knowledge of the more important branches of the law and on the candidates’ 
intellectual ability and ethics. Those who pass the examination have to follow further 
training at the Training Centre established by the Department of Justice. The period of 
the training is 12 months and conducted in Jakarta.”). 
222. See O’Brien, supra note 194, at 367–68; see also LEGAL & JUDICIAL RESEARCH 
CTR. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDON., supra note 197, at 19 (“At the 
recommendation of the Senior Judge of the respective district court, he/she will be 
appointed as a full fledged judge and start his/her career in a district court which has a 
IIB rank (this is the lowest rank of a district court; in gradual order there are district 
courts with the following ranks: IIB, IIA, IB and IA). The career path of a judge, after 
being transferred to different districts and in different positions, will be as follows: 
Senior Judge (Hakim Ketua) of several types of district courts, judge of an appellate 
court and then Senior Judge of a Court of Appeal (appellate court). Afterwards he/she 
may become justice of the Supreme Court.”). 
223. See LEGAL & JUDICIAL RESEARCH CTR. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDON., 
supra note 197, at 42 (“Article 13 [provides:] To be eligible for appointment as a judge 
of Religious Court a candidate must meet the following requirements: a. be a citizen of 
Indonesia; b. a Moslem; c. be devoted to almighty God; d. be loyal to the Pancasila and 
the 1945 Constitution; e. not be former member of the outlawed organization and not 
be a person who was involved directly in the Counter-revolutionary Movement G 30 S/ 
Indonesian Communist Party, including the mass organization, or PKI or any other 
outlawed organizations, a civil servant; possesses a law graduate degree in Syariah or 
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submit a letter of interest, with detailed information concerning 
his or her education, health, and good conduct to the national 
Bureau of Islamic Courts. 224 A written certification declaring 
that s/he will accept a placement anywhere within Indonesia 
must also accompany the correspondence. 225 
Upon appointment, all judges must undertake an official 
oath in the name of God, “swear[ing] to ‘be faithful to and 
defend and apply the Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the 
state, [and] the Constitution of 1945.’” 226 
The court’s jurisdiction extends to marriage, inheritance, 
and charitable endowments.227 No gendered distinction is made 
vis-à-vis qualifications, transfers, promotions, or interpretive 
rights. 228 
2. Women 
Indonesia has a positive record of gender empowering 
legislation.229 Since 1945, the Indonesian Constitution has 
proclaimed gender equality while laying protection to female 
participation in the political arena.230 In 1952, the country 
ratified the United Nations Convention on Political Rights of 
Women and enacted legislation empowering women with the 
right to vote and to serve in the legislature.231 In 1984, it also 
ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”); more 
                                                                                                             
graduate degree in Law specializing the Islamic; f. be at least 25 years of age; g. of high 
integrity, responsible, honest, just and have a character that is not culpable.”). 
224. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 51. 
225. See id. 
226. See Hooker, supra note 108, at 41 (alteration in original). 
227. See id. Articles 49 to 53 articulate the powers of the Court. “Article 49 
establishes the courts’ jurisdiction over marriage, inheritance and [charitable trusts].” 
Id. 
228. See LEGAL & JUDICIAL RESEARCH CTR. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDON., 
supra note 197, at 18–22, 42. 
229. See Ani Widyani Soetjipto, Big Party Politics, Still a Man’s World—A Report on 
Indonesia, in GAINING GROUND? SOUTHEAST ASIAN WOMEN IN POLITICS AND DECISION-
MAKING, TEN YEARS AFTER BEIJING: A COMPILATION OF FIVE COUNTRY REPORTS 39, 39 
(Beate Martín ed., 2004). 
230. See id. 
231. See id. 
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than a decade later, it also ratified the Optional Protocol of the 
Women Convention. 232 
In 1989, the Religious Judiciary Act codified the selection 
and appointment of female Islamic court judges.233 In fact, 
women first ascended to the bench in 1964 when two women 
were appointed to civil judgeships and another fifteen assumed 
part-time Islamic court judgeships.234 A subsequent debate 
ensued among Indonesian Islamic law scholars regarding the 
permissibility of women serving in such a capacity.235 In 
response, government officials utilized the Necessity Argument, 
asserting the dearth of qualified male judicial candidates;236 
Shafii maintained that female judges could serve as necessary.237 
Women have since served on the bench—religious and 
secular.238 The Religious Judiciary Act merely codified the 
normative practice.239 
The government continues to implement positive policy 
initiatives, most notably gender mainstreaming and voluntary 
quotas,240 to ensure gender equality and further enhance female 
political representation and participation.241 The United Nations 
Economic and Social Council characterized gender 
                                                                                                             
232. See id. 
233. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 49. 
234. See id. 
235. See id. 
236. See id. 
237. See BADAWI, supra note 53; see also WOMEN JUDGES IN THE ARAB REGION: 
POINT, COUNTERPOINT, supra note 88. 
238. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 49. 
239. See id. 
240. See Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Op-Ed, Woman on Panel of Judges, JAKARTA 
POST, Nov. 15 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 1516984. (“In a highly patriarchal society 
and state system and amidst the prevailing gender imbalance in all aspects of life, 
particularly in occupations and education, it is very difficult to apply purely a system of 
meritocracy and all the more so with the inter-gender competition system without any 
intervention through affirmative action as regulated in Article 4 of the Convention 
juncto Law No. 7/1984.”). 
241. See United Nations Entity for Gend. Equal. and the Empowerment of 
Women, Gender Maintreaming, UN WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/
gendermainstreaming.htm (last visted Feb. 12, 2014) (“Gender Mainstreaming is a 
globally accepted strategy for promoting gender equality. Mainstreaming is not an end 
in itself but a strategy, an approach, a means to achieve the goal of gender equality. 
Mainstreaming involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of 
gender equality are central to all activities - policy development, research, advocacy/ 
dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning, implementation and 
monitoring of programmes and projects.”). 
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mainstreaming as identifying the gendered consequences of 
legislation, policies, or programs of a political, economic, and 
social nature to guard against inequalities.242 While many 
development programs are designed as gender neutral, they 
have, in fact, impacted men and women differently with varying 
rates of access to opportunity.243 Typically, women trail behind 
men, with lower rates of participation in projects and society.244 
Illustrative of Indonesia’s efforts is the Presidential 
Instruction No. 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming in National 
Development requiring gender mainstreaming by national and 
local government agencies in planning, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation of all development policies and 
programs.245 The law is designed to heighten consciousness 
about gender rights issues, especially among decision- and 
policy-makers.246 Resulting initiatives include the establishment 
of a Special Service Room at Indonesian police stations for 
female victims of violence and proposed regulations requiring 
the inclusion of a female judge on a judicial panel examining 
rape cases and other matters involving gendered violence.247 
Yet, notwithstanding these legislative initiatives, gender 
rights advocates continue to voice concern regarding what they 
view as a patriarchal culture repressive to women’s 
advancement.248 Specifically, they claim that social pressures 
dissuade women from assuming active roles in the public 
                                                                                                             
242. See Soetjipto, supra note 229, at 70–71. 
243. See id. at 71. 
244. See id. 
245. See id. 
246. See id.; see also Tifa Asrianti, More Agencies Will Apply Gender-based Budgeting in 
2012: Agency, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 4, available at 2011 WLNR 21685153 
(“The government will implement what it calls a “gender-responsive budget” in 27 
ministries and institutions and 10 pilot provinces next year, according to the nation’s 
development agency. The policy is part of the 2010-2014 Midterm National 
Development Plan to create gender-responsive governance, as mandated by a 2000 
Presidential Instruction on gender mainstreaming in national development. This 
includes translating the government’s commitment to upholding gender quality into 
budgetary policies in which female and male citizens are equally involved in 
development.”). 
247. See Katjasungkana, supra note 240 (“[I]ssuance of a regulation requiring the 
presence of a woman judge on a panel of judges examining every rape case or case of 
violence against women and other women-related matters, will at least give peace and 
courage to women to make a legal complaint about their problems.”). 
248. See Soetjipto, supra note 229, at 39–40. 
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sphere. 249 They cite to traditional cultural norms yielding to a 
public-private dichotomy that pressures women to restrict their 
contributions to their families and households—the private 
domain.250 Women have internalized a sense of gendered 
inferiority informed by an insecurity concerning their ability to 
excel in political work.251 Moreover, women who pursue political 
endeavors confront discrimination and prejudice in electoral 
processes, legislative bodies and political parties.252 
These assertions hold true of the judiciary, too—the 
number of female judges remains comparatively low.253 In 1997, 
women comprised fifteen percent of appellate judges; that 
number rose by a little more than five percent (to twenty-one 
per cent) in 1999.254 Notably, as of 1999, female administrative 
judges were equal in number to their male counterparts.255 
Some observers hypothesized that perhaps more women are 
interested in the administrative judgeships because of the 
substantive areas involved, which may also not require as much 
field work or mobility.256 
Advocates claim the religious courts hold the most 
formidable gendered social barriers to entry.257 In Indonesia, 
religious scholars are often identified with men.258 This is 
                                                                                                             
249. See id. 
250. See id. 
251. See id. 
252. See id. 
253. See id. at 54. 
254. See id. at 55–56 (“No women sits as chair or vice chair in any of the religious 
appellate courts. This is a strategic loss because the majority of the population is 
Muslim, and many legal disputes concerning women and children such as marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance rights are often resolved through religious courts.”). 
255. See id. 
256. See id. at 56. 
257. See id. 
258. See id.; see also, Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 63 (“The process of 
becoming an Islamic judge in Indonesia has changed and developed over the years. 
During the colonial period and in the early years following independence, the creation 
of Islamic court judges was quite simple. Judges who served on Islamic courts were 
recruited from among the local ulama, who had generally been trained informally in 
traditional Islamic schools. This began to change in the 1960s as judges were 
increasingly recruited from among the graduates of formal schools established 
specifically for the purpose of producing judges for Islamic courts. Since 1989, the 
process of becoming an Islamic judge has been governed in detail by the Religious 
Judiciary Act, which itself has gone through a number of revisions in line with changes 
in policy on the Islamic judiciary and the Indonesian legal system in general.”). 
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significant because during the country’s colonial era, Islamic 
court judges were selected from among the local circle of 
religious scholars (e.g. ulema), who had been educated in 
traditional Islamic schools.259 Beginning in the 1960s, religious 
court judges included formal law school graduates from 
institutions specifically founded to produce Islamic court 
judges.260 The gendered perception surrounding Islamic law 
experts, however, lingers.261 In this context, women are often 
cited as being too emotional and irrational—the Nature 
Argument—to serve as Islamic law judges; it is peculiar that the 
argument only arises in the religious judicial context, 
however.262 
As of 2009, seventy-eight percent of the Islamic trial court 
judges were male and twenty-two percent were female.263 The 
number of women serving as appellate judges in the Islamic 
courts was even more meager: five percent.264 In 2011, women 
accounted for 23.4% of all trial court judges across the nation, 
and 15.4% of appellate judges.265 Much of the country’s progress 
seems to be attributable to more tolerant and inclusive 
interpretations of Islam, and official promotion of gender 
mainstreaming policies among all levels of institutional decision-
making.266 
B. Egypt 
Since 1923, all Egyptian Constitutions have explicitly 
guaranteed gender equality.267 The 1956 Constitution declared 
                                                                                                             
259. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 44–45. 
260. See id. at 45–46. 
261. See id. at 50. 
262. See Soetjipto, supra note 229, at 56. 
263. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 57. 
264. Id.  
265. See Asrianti, supra note 246. 
266. See generally Soetjipto, supra note 229 (discussing various programs and 
efforts aimed at making progress regarding gender inequality). 
267. See Hassan, supra note 125, at 17–18. (“The constitution of 1923 determined 
in Article 3 that ‘Egyptians are equal before the law, and equal in society in civil and 
political rights. There is no discrimination between them on the basis of origin, 
language or religion concerning their public duties and obligations.’ The constitution 
of 1956 stated in article 31 that ‘Egyptians are equal before the law and equal in rights 
and public duties. There is no discrimination between them on the basis of sex, origin, 
language, religion or conviction.’ The constitution of 1971 determined in article 11 
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Islam the Muslim majority state’s official religion but with few 
details regarding what that meant.268 In 1971, Egypt witnessed 
the birth of a new Constitution that added Islamic law as a 
principal source of legislation.269 
While the 1971 Egyptian Constitution was initially 
suspended following President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation in 
2011 and subsequently voided the following year,270 this Section 
remains focused upon its provisions as those in effect during the 
initial appointment and continued ascension of women to the 
bench. 
The 1971 Constitution’s notable provisions in the instant 
context include those referencing Islam as the state religion, 
establishing Islamic law as a primary source for legislation, and 
providing gender equality in the political, cultural, and 
economic areas of life (so long as that does not contravene 
religious law).271 The Constitution was amended in 1980 to 
reflect Islamic law as the primary legislative source.272 Further, 
the nation’s civil law code also includes specific references to 
religious law.273 For instance, the Egyptian civil code of 1949 
ranks Islamic law as a secondary source of law upon which a 
judge may rely in formulating a ruling.274 
                                                                                                             
that ‘the state guarantees accommodation between women’s duties to the family and to 
work within society; the state guarantees equality between men and women in the 
arenas of political, social, cultural, and economic life, keeping in accordance with the 
rulings of Islamic Law.’ Article 40 of the same constitution states, “citizens are equal 
before the law and in rights and duties; there is no discrimination between them on the 
basis of sex, origin, language, religion or conviction.”). 
268. See Adel Omar Sherif, Constitutions of Arab Countries and the Position of the 
Shari’a, in THE SHARI’A IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, IRAN AND EGYPT—
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE LAW 155, 157–58 (Nadjma Yassari ed.). 
269. See id. at 158–59. 
270. See Michael Lipin, Egypt’s New Constitution: How it Differs from Old Version, 
VOICE (Dec. 25, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/egypt-constitution/
1572169.html. 
271. See Hassan, supra note 25, at 18. 
272. See Baudouin Dupret, A Return to Sharia?, in THE SHARIA IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, IRAN AND EGYPT—IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE LAW, 
supra note 268, at 161, 163. 
273. See id. 
274. See id. (“Also, a realm is explicitly acknowledged for Islamic law and its 
principles in various sections of the civil code, particularly as regards successions and 
wills. As for personal status (marriage, divorce, separation, alimony, child custody, 
inheritance, etc.), it is totally referred to the individuals’ denomination, each of those 
acknowledged in Egypt having its own specific legal texts and competent judicial 
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These provisions highlight the continued significance of 
rights empowered interpretations of Islamic law. As noted above, 
the majority of Islam’s classical schools of law prohibit women 
from serving as judges, including the Hanafi school, codified 
into statutory law in personal status matters.275 
Commentators have observed that there has never been an 
explicit constitutional or statutory legal impediment to women 
serving as judges.276 Rather, objections have typically sounded in 
cultural and social norms as well as religious ideology.277 
Illustrative are negative case precedents on this point. 
For instance, in 1979, two women lost lawsuits challenging 
the official rejection of their applications for judgeships on 
account of their gender.278 The influence of rights restrictive 
interpretations of Islamic law upon Egypt’s secular legal system 
is evident in the court’s ultimate holding: 
It is clear from the cases’ records, evidence and surrounding 
conditions that the factors upon which the administrative 
body based its appraisal of inappropriateness in appointing 
the plaintiff to the rank of judge are found in the Egyptian 
environment, and are embodied in two essential 
fundaments. The first of these is the common law 
exemplified in society’s longstanding view towards women. 
                                                                                                             
chambers for the various levels of jurisdiction. As regards Muslims, a series of texts have 
codified the hanafi legal tradition.”(citations omitted)). 
275. See Amina Elbendary, Women on the Bench, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, Jan. 9–15, 
2003, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/620/fr2.htm (“Religious scholars have also 
disagreed on the permissibility of a woman holding senior positions of state, including 
that of judge. Three of the four main schools of Sunni jurisprudence deny women’s 
right to any such appointment, with the fourth Hanafi school holding that a qualified 
woman can be appointed judge.”). 
276. See Hassan, supra note 125, at 17–18 (“Egyptian statutory legislation is 
completely devoid of any text that deprives women from the right to occupy any public 
post.”). 
277. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 27 (“Half of the respondents thought that Islamic 
Law prohibits women from holding judgeships. More than a quarter of the 
respondents claimed to not know the position in Islamic law on this matter, and slightly 
less than a quarter of the respondents stated that Islamic Law allows this. When 
questioned as to the source of religious knowledge on this issue, many of the 
respondents said they based this opinion on the Hadith that warns of women having 
guardianship [authority]. However, they admitted that they had not come across 
reference to the issue itself and thus relied on the position of religion towards women 
more generally. This position [supposedly] characterizes women as inadequate in 
terms of reason and religion, and that implies that men are superior to women.”). 
278. See Hassan, supra note 125, at 14–15. 
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This view holds that women are of a lower level than men, 
and less significant, either due to the nature of their very 
being or because of their falling behind men in standards of 
knowledge and culture. The second factor is the widespread 
belief that the rulings of Islamic Law prohibit appointing 
women in any public powers, including the judiciary. 279 
The ruling alludes to several rights restrictive arguments 
depicted above, including the Nature Argument and references 
to the majority opinions of pre-modern Islamic jurists. It also 
relies upon false assumptions concerning women’s inferior 
intellect, frequently informed by the Witness Argument, and its 
implications for women’s competency more generally. 
1. The Judiciary 
The Egyptian court system has often served as a model 
emulated by counterparts in the Arab world.280 A civil law system, 
greatly impacted by French rules and procedures, it consists of 
“both regular courts and exceptional court systems”281 including 
administrative,282 civil,283 and criminal courts, a Supreme 
Constitutional Court,284 family courts, military courts, national 
                                                                                                             
279. See id. 
280. See Mahmoud M. Hamad, The Politics of Judicial Selection of Egypt, in 
APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM 
AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 194, at 260, 261–62. 
281. Id. 
282. See Mohamed S.E. Abdel Wahab, UPDATE: An Overview of the Egyptian Legal 
System and Legal Research, NYULAWGLOBAL.ORG (Oct. 2012), http://
www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Egypt1.htm#_The_Egyptian_Legal (“The classical 
dichotomy of public and private law has resulted in the establishment of the Council of 
State (Conseil d’Etat), which consists of administrative courts vested with the power to 
decide over administrative disputes pertaining to administrative contracts and 
administrative decrees issued by government officials and ministries.”); see also Dupret, 
supra note 272, at 164 (“Administrative law is handled by the Council of State, an 
institution made up of three sections (Judiciary, Consultative, and Legislative), the 
highest of which being the High Administrative Court.” (citations omitted)). 
283. See Dupret, supra note 272, at 164 (“Civil law is divided into summary courts 
(for minor issues) and plenary courts at the first instance level, courts of appeal, and 
the Court of Cassation.”). 
284. See Wahab, supra note 282 (“The Supreme Constitutional Court was 
established in 1970 replacing the Supreme Court established in 1960 and has exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide questions regarding the constitutionality of laws and regulations, 
as well as negative and positive conflict of jurisdiction.”); see also Dupret, supra note 
272, at 75 (“The Supreme Constitutional Court is competent regarding the 
interpretation of laws, controlling constitutionality, and conflict resolution concerning 
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security courts, as well as other specialized courts.285 Notably, 
there are no religious courts, although, as noted above, Islamic 
law may inform the court’s holdings.286 
Egypt’s judiciary represents a third independent source of 
State authority (in addition to the executive and legislative 
branches), and the executive is responsible for appointments.287 
Indeed, similar to Indonesia, judicial selection mirrors the 
European civil law model.288 Upon completion of a university 
degree,289 candidates must perform well on a preliminary written 
examination.290 Upon doing so, a committee of attorneys and 
judges select those most suitable for the bench based upon 
applicant character and intellect.291 Once finalized, the 
President issues a decree appointing the new group of judges.292 
                                                                                                             
competence between jurisdictions. It can be referred to by any judge if the 
constitutionality of a law or of a statutory text is challenged.”). 
285. See Wahab, supra note 282; see also Dupret, supra note 272, at 163–64 (“As 
Bernard Botiveau says, ‘today the judicial system, in its general principles and in its 
outline holds many of the basic characteristics usually found when describing the 
judicial structure of a modern state: separation of judiciary and administrative 
jurisdictional orders, of civil and criminal jurisdictions, independence of the judiciary, 
etc.” ( citations omitted)). 
286. See Dupret, supra note 272, at 164 (“There is no longer any specifically 
Islamic jurisdiction, since the denominational courts were abolished and replaced in 
1955 by specialised sections of state courts.”). 
287. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 23. 
288. See Hamad, supra note 280, at 262 (“The official prerequisites for admission 
to the office of magistrate are: (1) the candidate must be an Egyptian citizen who 
enjoys his civil rights, all the required guarantees of morality, and good reputation, (2) 
the candidate must have an LLB from an accredited university or an equivalent degree 
from Al-Azhar, and (3) the candidate must be at least twenty-one years old for the 
office of public prosecutor, and thirty years old for the court of first instance.”). 
289. See id. at 262 n.11 (“Law education in Egypt is conducted through national 
universities, Al-Azhar, and the Police Academy. The curriculum includes all of the 
normal courses in any modern law college. In addition, certain other groups of courses 
are related to the Islamic legal system. Thus the construction of the syllabus for the LLB 
in Egypt is a reflection of the history of the legal development in the country.”) 
290. See id. 
291. See id. (“The second important characteristic of successful judicial candidates 
is a suitable family background. In practice this usually means that they should be from 
the upper-middle or upper stratum of society. Thirdly, none of a candidate’s immediate 
relatives should have been accused of anti-regime sentiments or activities.” (citations 
omitted)). 
292. See id. at 263 (“The State Council has a similar recruitment process. Senior 
members of the council, such as the president and vice-presidents, serve as gate-keepers 
to the administrative judiciary. However, the Administrative Prosecution Body is a 
separate entity with a different selection process. The two main streams of the Egyptian 
court system, the ordinary judiciary and the State Council, resemble the French system. 
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In contrast to its Indonesian counterpart, the Egyptian 
judiciary enjoys high prestige, and the appointment process is 
highly competitive.293 Egyptian society accords judges 
considerable deference, also reflected in their comparatively 
high government salaries.294 
2. Women 
As depicted above, for generations, women were prohibited 
from pursuing judicial careers.295 Women’s exclusion is not 
codified in constitutional or statutory law but reflects normative 
discriminatory practice by government officials.296 In 1949, a 
young female law graduate challenged the denial of her judicial 
application on account of gender; the Egyptian court with 
appropriate jurisdiction upheld the decision citing social and 
political grounds. 297 
Indeed, legal and jurisprudential developments frequently 
represent social manifestations.298 According to research 
gauging popular Egyptian thought on the subject, the majority 
of respondents referenced religion and its law as informing their 
views.299 Unfortunately, the Egyptian religious stance has an 
adverse history. 
In 1952, the Fatwa Council of al-Azhar University300 issued 
this legal opinion: “‘There is general consensus that women are 
                                                                                                             
The fist position in the ordinary judicial structure is assistant district attorney, where 
the fresh appointee stays for one year. The appointee then expects to be promoted to 
the rank of associate district attorney, which he stays at for about two years. The third 
rank is district attorney. Based on seniority and competence, the appointee moves to 
the rank of first class district attorney. This rank is divided into two sub-ranks, A and B. 
Upon reaching the age of thirty, district attorneys may move to the court structure. 
Judge rank B is the gateway to the court system. Afterwards the judges are advanced 
within the judicial structure based on seniority and merit.” ( citations omitted)). 
293. See id. at 262. 
294. See id. 
295. See id. 
296. See Hoda Ragheb Awad, The Legal Status of Women in Egypt: Reform and Social 
Inertia, in WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: AGENTS OF CHANGE 129, 
145 (Fatima Sadiqi & Moha Ennaji eds., 2011). 
297. See Elbendary, supra note 275. 
298. See Fawzi, supra note 88, at 21. 
299. See id. at 27. 
300. See Dupret, supra note 272, at 162 (“Islam in Egypt is the religion of the state 
(Art. 2 of the Egyptian Constitution) and its public management is the duty of the 
shaykh of al-azhar, of the muftī of the Republic, and of the Minister of waqf, under the 
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not suitable for judicial authority and that it is sinful to charge 
her with such. The matter is not open for interpretation unless 
binding proof is had, for there is consensus on the matter.’”301 
The council was generally composed of senior Islamic law 
scholars, and notably, they cite to the majority opinion of the 
pre-modern jurists.302 For decades, varied assertions of the 
Nature and Islamic Law arguments dominated related public 
discourse.303 
In 1953, following the Al-Azhar Fatwa, the administrative 
courts issued a ruling excluding women from the judiciary, 
reasoning that “traditions and customs” made the appointment 
of female judges “inappropriate.”304 Several decades later, in 
1973, the administrative courts issued another ruling 
referencing Islamic law as the principal source of law (pursuant 
to the 1971 Constitution) and reasoned that while no law 
explicitly prohibited female judges, no provision explicitly 
provided that right either.305 They chose to continue excluding 
women from the administrative bench, thus closing the door to 
such appointments.306 
In 1988, a young female honors law graduate tried again, 
but her application to the administrative courts was denied on 
account of her gender.307 She appealed the decision and the 
                                                                                                             
direct authority of the President of the Republic. Regarding criminal matters, the sole 
explicit reference to Islam is the mandatory consulting of the muftī of the Republic in 
cases where a death penalty is handed down by the criminal court.” (citations 
omitted)). 
301. See Bayoumi, supra note 157, at 54–55. 
302. See Alaa Abd Al-Muta’al, The Principle of Equality in Egyptian and International 
Legislation, in WOMEN JUDGES IN THE ARAB REGION: POINT, COUNTERPOINT, supra note 
88, at 37 (“The dominant opinion in Islamic jurisprudence is that public powers, 
including judging among people, are to be held by men and not women.”). 
303. See Kovach, supra note 166, at 2 (“In 1998, when Egyptian women seemed on 
the brink of breaking into the judiciary, prominent judges like Mo- hammed Magdi 
Murgan panned the idea in the semiofficial press, saying: “The natural place for a 
woman is the house, in the shadow of a man.”). 
304. See Sarah Carr, Security Checks Don’t Mean Interference in State Council, Says 
Expert, DAILY NEWS EGYPT, MAR. 5, 2009, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/ 
Security+checks+don't+mean+interference+in+State+Council,+says+expert.-
a0194991075. 
305. See id. 
306. See id. 
307. See Nasrawi, supra note 3. 
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initial decision was subsequently upheld in a 1990 ruling finding 
the appointment of female judges religiously impermissible.308 
In 2000, however, President Hosni Mubarak appointed the 
first female justice Tahani El-Gebali309 to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, which did not include deciding civil or 
criminal court cases.310 At the time, women comprised 
approximately twenty percent of the legal profession.311 
The achievement appears to have resulted from a 
convergence of factors, including a secular feminist 
movement,312 and references to Islamic law313 as allowing the 
practice.314 Feminists typically argued that the Egyptian 
Constitution guarantees gender equality (e.g. Rule of Law) while 
highlighting women’s service in the Egyptian Cabinet and 
Parliament as evidence of women’s ability to achieve. 315 
Also critical to El-Gebali’s appointment directly to the 
Egyptian high court was the support of a prominent and well-
respected Constitutional Supreme Court justice.316 Chief Justice 
                                                                                                             
308. See id. 
309. See Elbendary, supra note 275 (“Until recently a member of the Nasserist 
Party, El-Gebali has spent her career as a lawyer. Graduating from Cairo University’s 
Faculty of Law in 1973, she later earned a diploma in Islamic Shari’a, and was the first 
woman elected to the board of the Lawyer’s Syndicate in 1989, being re- elected in the 
following round of elections. During her period at the Lawyer’s Syndicate, El-Gebali 
entered into many controversies with other members of the Muslim Brotherhood-
dominated board. In 1992, she was the first woman elected to the Permanent Bureau of 
the Union of Arab Lawyers. She is also a legal expert at the UN, an international 
commercial arbitrator and a lecturer at the Arab Institute for Human Rights in 
Tunis.”). 
310. See Salah Nasrawi, Egypt Names First Female Judges, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 15, 
2007, available at http://www.semissourian.com/story/1193823.html. 
311. See Kovach, supra note 166. 
312. See id. (“But thanks to a push by First Lady Suzanne Mubarak, the unofficial 
cultural capital of the Middle East may soon appoint its first female justices, according 
to the National Council of Women, established by the president in 2000.” ). 
313. See Nasrawi, supra note 3 (“‘There is nothing in Islam which says a woman 
cannot be a judge. She can be if she is fit for the job,’ Zaqzouk told Al-Wafd, a liberal 
opposition newspaper. Zaqzouk and others point to secular Tunisia, Iraq and Syria, 
all Muslim countries in which women serve as judges.”). 
314. See Kovach, supra note 166 (“We are an Islamic country, and there is nothing 
in sharia (Islamic law) that prevents a woman from being a judge,” says Mahmoud 
Yassien Talat, a lawyer representing his daughter Amaany in her bid to begin the track 
to judgeship.”). 
315. See Nasrawi, supra note 3. 
316. See Ahmed El Sayed, Female Judges in Egypt, 13 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 
135 (2006–2007). 
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Fathy Naguib’s support facilitated her appointment to the 
highest court in the Egyptian judicial hierarchy.317 Many 
believed that her appointment would help facilitate enhanced 
female access to the judiciary.318 
Yet, debate continued even among those who supported El-
Gebali’s appointment concerning interpretative rights.319 
Prominent judges subtly asserted the Nature Argument, insisting 
that while women may rule on family court cases as well as those 
related to commercial and property matters, they are not 
“suited” to decide criminal cases.320 Others made the Nature 
Argument more explicitly and unabashedly, claiming women 
lack the patience and stability required for judicial 
administration.321 
Religious scholars stressed the intersection of the 
Testimony and School of Laws Arguments—that the Hanafi 
school of Islamic law only permitted women to judge in 
substantive areas where her testimony is deemed competent 
(e.g. family but not criminal).322 Some jurists asserted the No 
Positions of Authority argument, claiming a woman could assist 
or advise men but she should not ascend to an authoritative 
public position.323 
By 2003, Egypt’s religious authorities embraced the Hanafi 
school of law’s opinion on the issue (e.g. women can judge 
substantive matters in which their testimony is deemed 
competent).324 Even the Muslim Brotherhood, then outlawed, 
                                                                                                             
317. See id. 
318. See id. 
319. See Kovach, supra note 166. 
320. See id. (“Judge Murgan still doesn’t think women are suitable to rule on 
criminal cases, but he says he’s no longer categorically against women justices. ‘We will 
be happy to see women judges in family courts, in business and property disputes. 
Women are more honest than men, and they’ve worked well as judges in many Arabic 
countries,’ he says.”). 
321. See Elbendary, supra note 275 (“In the controversy following the 
appointments, others have argued that a woman’s ‘emotional nature’ makes her unfit 
for the judiciary. ‘Justice requires patience and sturdiness, which women lack,’ Rayyan 
said.”). 
322. See id. 
323. See id. 
324. See id. (“The public has also gradually become more tolerant of the idea. 
Both the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and the Egyptian Grand Mufti have adopted the Hanafi 
opinion.”). 
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publicly expressed its assent.325 These developments should not 
be overlooked because, for decades, Mubarak refrained from 
appointing female judges fearing the Muslim conservative 
response.326 
In 2007, President Mubarak appointed thirty-one women, 
who previously served as state prosecutors, to judge in the family 
courts.327 Similar to El-Gebali’s appointment, critical here were 
the efforts and support of several prominent political figures 
including the head of the Supreme Judicial Council and the 
Minister of Justice, both of whom looked favorably upon the 
appointment of female judges.328 Prior to their collective 
appointment, El-Gebali was the sole female judge serving on the 
Constitutional Court.329 There are approximately 12,000 judges 
in Egypt.330 
Still some objected to the 2007 appointment. For instance, 
an Egyptian Member of Parliament filed a related lawsuit against 
the Minister of justice alleging that the appointments 
contravene Islamic law.331 He requested annulment of the 
Presidential decree placing the women on the bench but to no 
avail.332 
Controversy, however, continues to revolve around 
women’s interpretative rights. Women have not yet been 
appointed to judge in the administrative courts, where cases 
involve grievances lodged against government agencies.333 
Unlike civil law judges who interpret legislation, the 
administrative judiciary “make[s] the law.”334 As recently as 
                                                                                                             
325. See id. (“Maamoun El-Hodeibi, supreme guide of the outlawed Muslim 
Brotherhood, is also of the view that there is no reason why a qualified woman should 
not hold senior positions in government, including that of judge.”).  
326. See Nasrawi, supra note 310. 
327. See El Sayed, supra note 316; see also Women Judges Barred from Influential 
Egyptian Court, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Feb. 15, 2010 [hereinafter Women Judges Barred], 
available at http://www.google.com/ hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ixnTkZcV8tME
QaMrYDwhuuhoRf2w. 
328. See El Sayed, supra note 316, at 136. 
329. See Women Judges Barred, supra note 327. 
330. See Egypt Judges Row Highlights Unease over Women in Top Jobs, AGENCE FR. 
PRESSE, Feb. 25, 2010 [hereinafter Egypt Judges Row], available at http://article.wn.com/
view/2010/02/25/Egypt_judges_row_highlights_unease_over_women_in_top_jobs. 
331. See El Sayed, supra note 316, at 144–45. 
332. See id. 
333. See Carr, supra note 304. 
334. See id. 
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2009, judges continued to assert the Inferior Intellect Argument, 
claiming that women “do not have the same levels of 
intelligence and their brains weigh two grams less than those of 
men.”335 
Significantly, the administrative court’s assembly, consisting 
of almost four hundred judges, voted in 2010 to continue its 
exclusion of women.336 Human rights experts referred to the 
decision as emblematic of entrenched gender bias in the 
judiciary.337 In response, the Constitutional Supreme Court, 
following a request for clarification by the Prime Minister, ruled 
that the assembly lacked proper jurisdiction over the issue.338 
Rather, it tasked the court’s exclusively male executive board to 
render a finding.339 Still, judges asserted the Nature and 
Protectionist Arguments to justify the prior decision to 
exclude.340 Officials also cited the Physiology341 and Islamic law 
arguments.342 Some have also attributed the push for female 
judges as an import from “European and American agendas.”343 
                                                                                                             
335. See id. 
336. See Women Judges Barred, supra note 327 (“Three- hundred and eighty judges 
took part in the general assembly and voted, with 334 rejecting the appointment of 
females to judicial posts and 42 agreeing, with four abstentions.”). 
337. See Egypt Opens Way for Women Judges in Top Court, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Mar. 
14, 2010, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g5zb
Vpbsm8eqNS7G7AQ5uFCQ5fkQ (“It was roundly condemned by the New York-based 
body Human Rights Watch (HRW), which urged the government to end discrimination 
against women in judicial positions. “The continuing discrimination insults the many 
Egyptian women who are fully qualified to serve as judges,” Nadya Khalife, women’s 
rights researcher for the Middle East and North Africa at HRW, said at the time.”). 
338. See id. 
339. See id. 
340. See Egypt Judges Row, supra note 330 (“Despite steps to avoid gender-based 
discrimination, the idea that a woman’s place is in the home is deeply rooted . . . . ’ The 
circumstances are currently unsuitable for women to be judges,’ said Judge Mahmud al-
Khodeiri. ‘It’s a difficult job, we work in difficult conditions,’ he told AFP. Khodeiri said 
judges are not allowed to preside over courts in their place of residence, ‘so how is a 
woman supposed to abandon her husband and her children and go and work 
somewhere else?’ ‘Motherhood is something that carries all of society—it can’t be 
ignored.’”). 
341. See Kenyon, supra note 3 (“The state-run Al-Ahram newspaper reported that 
the women judges could require lengthy maternity leave, hampering the court’s 
efficiency.”). 
342. See id. (“Another high official in the group said he believed that naming 
women judges would violate Islamic proscriptions against meetings between unrelated 
men and women.”). 
343. See Al Sherbini, supra note 3 (“We have our reservations on this demand 
because we know that having female judges is pushed by feminists, and is not aimed at 
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In essence, female judges in Egypt continue to confront 
gender inequality vis-à-vis interpretative rights.344 For instance, 
the State permits them to preside over family matters but 
excludes them from the criminal and administrative courts.345 
Such distinctions reinforce gender stereotyping regarding 
female competency and capabilities.346 This, in turn, weakens 
and degrades their judicial stature, negatively impacting the 
possibility of promotions and career advancement more 
generally.347 
Still, these women are playing pioneering roles in legal and 
democratic reform while using their talents and education to 
raise their standard of living, enhancing the economy of their 
country and challenging entrenched misconceptions about 
gender.348 These perceptions appear to plague a predominantly 
male judiciary as well, thus casting doubt upon judicial 
impartiality.349 That prejudice and discrimination may manifest 
in the interpretation and application of legal texts in cases 
involving groups of historically disadvantaged litigants.350 
Finally, restrictions to female career achievement may not 
only be a result of external factors but internal barriers, too.351 
Female law graduates stymie professional growth by not applying 
to the bench as a result of insecurity, fear of reprisal, and their 
own misconceptions about proper Muslim women roles.352 
                                                                                                             
raising judicial standards. It is meant to promote European and US agendas.” He 
added that under Islamic Sharia, women were not allowed to become judges. 
According to Hussain Abdul Razeq, the secretary-general of the leftist Tagmmua Party, 
the move is significant. ‘But it is incomplete because it allows women to preside over 
family courts only,’ he said.”). 
344. See El Sayed, supra note 316, at 135. 
345. See id. at 136. 
346. See id. 
347. See id. at 137. 
348. See Fatima Sadiqi & Moha Ennaji, Introduction to WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
AND NORTH AFRICA: AGENTS OF CHANGE, supra note 296, at 1, 8–9. 
349. See Awad, supra note 286,  at 141. 
350. See id. 
351. See El Sayed, supra note 316, at 146–47. 
352. See id. at 14. 
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C. Iran 
Unlike Egypt or Indonesia, Iran is an Islamic republic with 
a population of approximately seventy million.353 Women’s roles 
fall across a wide spectrum, from independent business owners 
to victims of Iran’s morality police,354 to members of Parliament 
to those who walk silently behind their husbands on a public 
street, waiting for permission to speak.355 Iranian law empowers 
women to drive, vote, own property, and attend school.356 The 
legal system, however, also denies women equal rights in 
divorce, custody, and inheritance while rendering her court 
testimony as less credible than her male counterpart.357 The law 
also codifies her official exclusion from judgeships. 
References to Iranian law are commonly categorized into 
two periods: prior to the Islamic revolution of 1979 and 
following it.358 The current Iranian Constitution was adopted in 
1979 and subsequently amended in 1989.359 It establishes an 
                                                                                                             
353. See Margaret Coker, Shackled at Birth in Iran, Women Fight to Overcome, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 6, 2007, at 1C. 
354. See Mitra Shavarini, The Social (and Economic) Implications of Being an Educated 
Woman in Iran, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 132, 137 (2009) (“[I]n October 2007, a young 
woman by the name of Zahra Bani Yaghoub, a medical student at Tehran University, 
was arrested by the morality police in Hamedan, a city in the foothills of the Alvand 
Mountains in western Iran, where she was a volunteer physician as part of her medical 
studies. She was taken in to the police station because she was caught sitting on a park 
bench with her boyfriend while snacking on sunflower seeds during the month of 
Ramadan - problematic both because unrelated males and females seen together in 
public are subject to arrest, and because eating is strictly forbidden in all public areas 
during the month of Ramadan, when Muslims must fast. Shortly after her arrest, she 
notified her parents. By law, parents are required to appear before the morality police 
before their arrested daughter or son is released and must sign a document 
acknowledging blame and responsibility for their child’s morally wayward actions . . . . 
When Zahra’s parents arrived to retrieve their daughter from custody, the authorities 
delivered her corpse and claimed that suicide was the cause of her death.”). 
355. See Coker, supra note 353. 
356. See id. (“The majority of university students in Iran are women. Parliament 
has a small but consistent number of elected female members. Women excel at all 
fields open to them: the arts, education, business, law.”). 
357. See id. (“Yet Iran’s legal system also codifies traditions that confer second-
class status for women. A woman’s testimony in court is worth half that of a man. A girl 
is considered an adult under the law at age 9, but the age for boys is 13. The laws also 
deny women equal rights in divorce, custody and inheritance.”). 
358. See Behrooz Akhlaghi, Iranian Commercial Law and the New Investment Law 
FIPPA, in SHARĪ’A IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, AND EGYPT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE LAW, supra note 268, at 123, 123. 
359. See id. 
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Islamic Republic, declaring the supremacy of Islamic law.360 The 
State authority is comprised of the Supreme Leadership, the 
Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts, and the 
Expediency Discernment Council.361 
The Leadership is responsible for the government’s 
conformity with religious law vis-à-vis policy and actions.362 The 
Council of Guardians, comprised of clerics and legal experts, 
reviews legislation to ensure conformity with religious and 
constitutional law.363 The Assembly of Experts is a body of jurists 
and scholars subject to popular elections.364 Finally, the 
Expediency Discernment Council Principle is tasked with 
mediating conflicts that arise concerning the interpretation of 
law.365 
1. The Judiciary 
The Iranian Constitution also divides State power between 
the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branch.366 The 
Judiciary is independent of its sister branches of government.367 
In contrast to the largely Sunni majority populations in 
Indonesia and Egypt, Shiites dominate Iranian society. 368 
Classical Shi’a jurisprudence prohibits women from serving 
as judges.369 Many Shi’a believe, however, that this is subject to 
modification in response to changing times and 
circumstances.370 Presently, opposition to female judges sounds 
                                                                                                             
360. See id. 
361. See id. 
362. See id. 
363. See id. at 125 (“If a law is considered unIslamic or unconstitutional, the 
Council has the authority to veto it. Decisions as to whether a given law is 
unconstitutional are to be taken unanimously among all 12 council members, whereas 
the question of conformity with the Islamic Sharia is decided via a majority vote of the 
clerics. The Council also supervises presidential and parliamentary elections and 
plebiscites. In case of conflicting interpretations of the provisions of the constitution, 
the Council is empowered to give a binding ruling.”). 
364. See id. 
365. See id. 
366. See id. at 126. 
367. See id. 
368. See id. 
369. See Bayoumi, supra note 157, at 54. 
370. See Jamileh Kadivar, Women Working as Judges and Making Judicial Decisions, in 
WOMEN, POWER AND POLITICS IN 21ST CENTURY IRAN 107, 107–08 (Tara Povey & Elaheh 
Rostami-Povey eds., 2012). 
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in rights restrictive interpretations of Islamic law’s textual 
sources.371 
During Islam’s formative period, Shi’a judicial 
qualifications required religious literacy and the administration 
of justice.372 The first Shi’a jurist who discussed the gender of 
judicial candidates was the prominent Iranian Sheikh Toosi 
(10th century A.D.).373 He specifically prohibited women from 
judicial service.374 Other scholars have since adopted his 
interpretation.375 
Some Shi’a jurists have expressed their dissent, arguing that 
women with requisite knowledge of the law should be permitted 
to serve as judges.376 They stipulate, however, that she should do 
so in matters where her testimony is deemed competent.377 This 
position is identical to the Hanafi position in Sunni Islam, 
dominant in Egypt. 
Still others avoid the question of gender altogether, instead 
emphasizing the ability to administer justice and possession of 
requisite knowledge as the credentials of a qualified judicial 
candidate.378 This position mirrors dominant views during 
Islam’s formative period.379 
It is significant to note that the Shi’a legal opposition to 
women judges generally sounds in rights restrictive 
interpretations of the Quran, similar to Sunni detractors. 
Notably, they make Quranic arguments concerning male 
intellectual superiority (the Inferior Intellect Argument) 
thereby rendering men more capable leaders naturally 
                                                                                                             
371. See id. 
372. See id. at 110. 
373. See id. 
374. See id. 
375. See id. 
376. See id. at 112. 
377. See id. at 111. 
378. See id. (“My review of the literature demonstrates that the added 
interpretations were accepted by some jurists and rejected by others. For example, 
approximately 200 years ago, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi Saheb, a theorist of 
state in Shi’a jurisprudence and the author of Javaher al-kalam [The Jewel of the 
Word] discussed ‘justice’ and ‘knowledge’ as the two characteristics of judgment and 
judges. He also stated that other conditions are the added interpretations of later 
jurists.”). 
379. See id. 
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equipped to lead and judge.380 In this respect, the Quranic 
arguments intersect with the No Positions of Public Authority 
argument according to which judgeships are viewed as an 
extension of sovereign power.381 
Further, Shi’a jurists have relied upon rights restrictive 
interpretations of the Quran to exclude female participation in 
the public square altogether; by extension, she could not serve 
on the bench.382 To buttress their point, they reference the lives 
of the Prophet Muhammad’s wives.383 This may represent a lack 
of religious literacy or historical knowledge, however, because 
the Prophet Muhammad’s contemporaries, including his wives, 
were actively engaged in the political, economic, and legal 
spheres.384 
In addition to these arguments, Shii jurists also employ 
Hadith narratives to support prohibitions against female 
judges.385 As in Sunni Islam, one of the most frequently cited 
                                                                                                             
380. See id. at 112–13. (“There are three Quranic verses which are used by Shi’a 
jurists to justify their idea of only men working as judges. The first is Verse 34 of the 
famous chapter on women, Surah al-Nisa . . . . Those who refer to this verse argue that 
men are superior to women in knowledge, wisdom and insight. Therefore they have the 
right to lead and to make judicial decisions. In this context the act of passing judgment 
is regarded as a form of leadership . . . . The third verse is 228 of Surah al-Baqarah . . . . 
Here jurists have extended the issue of superiority of men over women, which are 
discussed in this verse, to the subject of judgment and have concluded that for this 
reason only men can be considered rejal (statesman) and can work as judges. This verse 
is specifically about women’s and men’s responsibilities towards each other. It relates to 
divorce, and hence cannot be used to deny women the right to work as judges.”). 
381. See id. (“According to this view, if women are given the right to make 
judgments, they should also be given the right to leadership, which, of course, is 
contrary to their interpretation of this verse.”). 
382. See id. at 112–13 (“Second Verse is 33 of Surah al-Azhab . . . . This verse 
specifically refers to the wives of the Prophet Muhammad. Jurists have concluded that 
this position can be extended to all women within any given society and for this reason 
women should not participate in the public sphere of the community and cannot 
therefore work as judges.”). 
383. See id. 
384. See id.; see also Engy Abdelkader, Using the Legacy of Muslim Women Leaders to 
Empower, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2012, 9:24 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/engy-abdelkader/legacy-muslim-women-leaders-
empower_b_1284480.html. 
385. See Kadivar, supra note 370, at 114 (“For example, the following narrative 
mentions the appointment of a man as a judge: ‘The tradition of Abu Khadijeh: - I was 
commanded by the Imam [Ja’far as-Sadiq (pbuh)] to convey the following message to 
our friends [Shi’a]: “when enmity and dispute arise among you, or you disagree 
concerning the receipt or payment of a sum of money, be sure not to refer the matter 
to one of these malefactors for judgment. Designate as judge and arbiter someone 
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Hadith prophesies the inevitable failure of any nation led by a 
woman, referenced and discussed in Section II above.386 Others 
rely on the Hadith Argument to assert that judicial decision 
making is a necessary religious undertaking exclusively relegated 
to the male sphere.387 Naturally, gender rights advocates attempt 
to undermine such arguments by questioning the Hadith’s 
underlying authenticity.388 
2. Women 
In 1934, Iran enacted its first law concerning judicial 
qualifications and there was no mention of gender.389 Women, 
however, were not appointed to the judiciary until 1970, and 
they worked in this capacity until the 1979 Revolution.390 The 
Revolution adversely impacted gender rights issues including 
the ability of women to serve on the bench. 391 
Immediately following the 1979 Revolution, Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini392 prohibited the appointment of women 
judges, employing Nature and Inferior Intellect Arguments, 
explaining that the female brain was undeveloped enough AND, 
as such, lacked judicial capacity.393 During the transitional 
government of 1980, all female judges were demoted to 
administrative positions,394 including perhaps most notably 
                                                                                                             
amongst you who is acquainted with our junctions concerning what is permitted and 
what is prohibited, for I appoint such a man as judge over you. Let none of you take 
your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power.”’”). 
386. See id. at 116 (“A nation which placed its affairs in the hands of a woman 
shall never prosper!”). 
387. See id. at 115 (“[T]he narratives that prohibit women from formulating 
judgments and working as judges are related to the arguments of Sheikh Sadogh, the 
Shi’a scholar and expert in Hadith, who in one of his books, Man la yahduruhu al-
Faqih [Every Man Is His Own Lawyer)[sic], quotes the Prophet Muhammad’s will 
which was made to Imam Ali. According to Saddogh, the Prophet Mohammad implied 
that certain tasks are not obligatory for women such as attending Friday prayers, Friday 
prayers congregations, calling people to prayer, attending sick people or funerals and 
making judicial decisions.”). 
388. See id. 
389. See id. at 108. 
390. See id. 
391. See id. 
392. Upon the revolution’s success, he was named Iran’s religious and political 
leader for life. See Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini— Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://
www.biography.com/people/ayatollah-ruhollah-khomeini-13680544. 
393. See Coker, supra note 353, at 1C. 
394. See Kadivar, supra note 370, at 108–09. 
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Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Shirin Ebadi.395 She was one of 
approximately one hundred women serving as judges at that 
time.396 
The 1979 Constitution did not codify an explicit legal 
prohibition against female judges.397 Rather it provided that 
judicial qualifications are determined by law and Islamic 
jurisprudence.398 Several years later, in 1982, a new law excluded 
women from judgeships.399 The exclusion was similarly codified 
in a 1983 law regarding judicial employment.400 
In 1985, gender rights advocacy culminated in an 
amendment to the laws, thus permitting women to serve as 
advisors in the civil courts and in the Office of the Guardianship 
of Underage Children.401 Other legal reform resulted in women 
serving as advisors in divorce and family courts matters where 
                                                                                                             
395. See Coker, supra note 353; see also Linda Deutsch, Female Nobel laureates push 
for peace in U.S-Iran tensions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 12, 2006, http://
www.apnewsarchive.com/2006/Female-Nobel-Laureates-Launch-Peace-Bid/id-fdcc986
072d9285e7f582d12ae3a2ff2 (“Shirin Ebadi remembers a time years ago when she was 
one of 100 women judges in the courtrooms of Iran. And she recalls what it was like to 
be deposed from her job when the Islamic revolution changed everything. ‘After the 
revolution, we were informed that women could not be judges anymore and women 
judges were demoted to administrative levels,’ she said in an interview Tuesday in Los 
Angeles. ‘I became the clerk of the court in which I had been the judge. Of course, I 
couldn’t tolerate that and I got early retirement.’”). 
396. See Deutsch, supra note 395. 
397. See Kadivar, supra note 370, at 108. 
398. See id. at 108. 
399. See id. at 108–09. 
400. See id. at 109 (“Parliament passed the law, which stated the conditions for 
eligibility: the judge must be a believer, just, a practicing Muslim, and faithful to the 
regime of the Islamic Republic; he must have been born as a legitimate child, have 
Iranian nationality, not be addicted to drugs, have the ability to practice ijtihad or to 
have permission from the high judicial council to pass judgments and be a man. In 
practice, this law denied women the right to work as judges and gave the authority to 
the high judicial council to implement the law for all those women who were already 
working as judges. According to this new law female judges either had to be removed 
from the judiciary or had to work in other areas of the judiciary. As a result female 
judges were offered a number of options: those who had worked for fifteen years or 
more could retire, and those who were eligible for administrative positions could work 
as administrators. Those judges who were not willing to be demoted to administrative 
positions were offered one month’s salary and other entitlements for every year of their 
service as a redundancy package. Hence many women were demoted to the position of 
court clerk.”). 
401. See id. at 109. 
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judges were required to consult with female advisors prior to 
issuing a decision.402 
The laws continued to exclude women from serving on the 
bench, however; female court participation was restricted to an 
advisory capacity.403 While women presently occupy some 
judicial posts in Iran, they are still prohibited from rendering 
the final decision.404 These developments were largely in 
response to increasing numbers of female law graduates 
demanding equal access to judicial careers.405 
Indeed, women confront obstacles on the Iranian job 
market. On the one hand, she is permitted to empower herself 
with an education but is legally excluded from pursuing 
particular career tracks and socially denied others.406 Often, 
female applicants are turned away in favor of a prospective male 
employee who is presumably financially responsible for 
supporting his family.407 In the event she obtains employment, 
she frequently finds herself in a male-dominated workspace 
where her colleagues treat her as possessing relaxed morals and 
religious standards.408 This is largely because the population has 
been socialized to believe that the most honorable status for 
women is as wife and mother.409 
                                                                                                             
402. See id. at 110. 
403. See id. at 109. 
404. See id. 
405. See id. (“In 1996 the law was further reformed. According to this reformed 
law, women who were eligible to work as judges could work as advisors in other legal 
institutions such as the Supreme Administrative Court and as investigative judges at the 
Offices of Legal Studies and the Codification of Law in the Ministry of Justice. They 
could also work as advisors to legal departments and other departments which required 
judicial positions.”); see also Shavarini, supra note 354, at 132. 
406. See Thomas Erdbrink, Iranian Parliament Delays Vote on Bill That Upset 
Judiciary, Women’s Activists, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2008, at A9 (“‘The Iranian government 
has created squadrons of policewomen, bus drivers and female university students,’ she 
said. ‘But at the same time, they want to turn women into housewives and make them 
accept polygamy.’”). 
407. See Shavarini, supra note 354, at 132. 
408. See id. 
409. See id. (“Or when a young woman is given a job, she typically finds herself in 
a predominately male work environment. There, she’s made to feel uncomfortable. 
She tries to be professional but her male colleagues think of her as ‘loose’ . . . cheap . . . 
unfeminine. They seem to lose respect for her. Remember that in this society, they’ve 
been raised to believe that the highest respected position for women is that of wives 
and mothers. This government’s religious propaganda has been that it’s only these 
women who have a place in heaven. So imagine how a young woman, raised in this era, 
366 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:309 
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
In each of the three countries examined above, perceptions 
surrounding and interpretations of religion and its law 
influenced the ability of women to serve as judges. Tolerant, 
more inclusive interpretations of Islamic law in Indonesia 
facilitated women’s entry into the country’s judiciary, including 
the religious courts, notwithstanding entrenched stereotypes 
concerning religion as the exclusive domain of men.410 While 
Indonesian society widely views the judiciary as corrupt, gender 
rights advocates continued to push for reform to ensure 
representative female participation.411 
Government policies may account in large part for their 
success in increasing rates of female participation.412 Specifically, 
the practice of gender mainstreaming—unique to Indonesia in 
the instant analysis—contributes to enhanced women’s roles, 
including in the State’s judiciary.413 Of the three countries 
surveyed here, Indonesia enjoys the highest rates of female 
judgeships and an absence of gendered interpretative 
restrictions vis-à-vis the law or normative social practice.414 
Yet, perceived barriers to a judicial career were most 
pronounced around entry to the religious courts.415 Again, this 
likely speaks to popular gendered expectations concerning 
Islamic scholars as male.416 While Indonesian courts continue to 
struggle with the type of Islamic law they wish to apply in dispute 
resolution, it appears they have successfully overcome rights 
                                                                                                             
brainwashed in this system, working in an office is made to feel: she feels internally 
conflicted.”). 
410. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197. 
411. See generally Hamad, supra note 280. 
412. See United Nations Entity for Gend. Equal. and the Empowerment of 
Women, supra note 241 (“Gender Mainstreaming is a globally accepted strategy for 
promoting gender equality. Mainstreaming is not an end in itself but a strategy, an 
approach, a means to achieve the goal of gender equality. Mainstreaming involves 
ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are 
central to all activities - policy development, research, advocacy/ dialogue, legislation, 
resource allocation, and planning, implementation and monitoring of programmes 
and projects.”); see also Soetjipto, supra note 229. 
413. See United Nations Entity for Gend. Equal. and the Empowerment of 
Women, supra note 241. 
414. See Asrianti, supra note 246. 
415. See Soetjipto, supra note 229. 
416. See id.; see also Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197. 
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restrictive religious interpretations prohibiting women from 
serving in their ranks.417 Indeed, Indonesian Islam—as 
influenced by the country’s rich cultural and religious 
diversity—has not obstructed women’s professional 
advancement, thus challenging the assertion that women are 
necessarily oppressed in all Muslim majority societies.418 
In striking similarity to Egypt and Iran, gender rights 
activists bemoan a patriarchal society where women’s roles are 
frequently relegated to the home in the private-public 
dichotomy.419 As such, one of the priorities of these advocates 
must be empowering women and girls with the confidence and 
capability to succeed in diverse professional contexts, including 
embarking upon a judicial career.420 While these women may be 
forced to overcome external barriers to the path of professional 
success, they must first grapple with internal ones surrounding 
proper female roles and competence sounding in religious and 
cultural narratives.421 The Indonesian government should work 
collaboratively with civil society leaders and organizations, as 
well as religious entities, to design, implement and promote 
related educational programs focused on female 
empowerment.422 
                                                                                                             
417. See BOWEN, supra note 190, at 9. 
418. See BENNETT, supra note 163, at 198. 
419. See POMPE, supra note 206. 
420. See Thuwayba Al Barwani, Women, Education, and the Redefinition of 
Empowerment and Change in a Traditional Society: The Case of Oman, in WOMEN IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: AGENTS OF CHANGE, supra note 296, at 215, 215. 
421. See GCC ‘Needs More Female Judges’, GULF DAILY NEWS (Nov. 3, 2008), http://
www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=233519 (“She said the struggle 
wasn’t just to convince men they could do the job, but also to get women to believe in 
their ability). See also, MUSLIM, supra note 88, at 25 (“A number of the female 
respondents held the same view as men in regards to the inadequacy of women and 
their lack of qualifications for the role of judge. This suggests women’s self image is 
based on a historically contrived model by men.”). 
422. See Barwani, supra note 420, at 215 (“Education is the single most important 
and consistent factor in the empowerment of women, irrespective of race, religion or 
culture. While there is an ongoing debate regarding the definition of empowerment 
and whether or not Eurocentric definitions (which typically emphasize independence 
from and equal rights to men) truly represent the aspirations of women in all societies, 
the critical importance of education in empowerment remains largely uncontested. 
Similarly uncontested is the belief that education empowers women to challenge 
themselves to take roles and responsibilities that enable them to be a catalyst of 
change.”). 
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In Egypt, popular, scholarly, and official concepts 
surrounding Islam and its law have influenced women’s 
(in)ability to ascend to the bench.423 While not codified in 
constitutional or statutory law, rights restrictive interpretations 
were leveraged to categorically exclude women judges for 
decades.424 It is interesting to note female agency in challenging 
these discriminatory normative practices before the courts 
notwithstanding less than ideal outcomes.425 Several factors 
appear to have clearly contributed to the successful 
appointment of women to the Egyptian judiciary. 
First, the appointments occurred only when prominent 
religious authorities (e.g. Al-Azhar) modified their previously 
restrictive position; this development undoubtedly had a positive 
sociological effect lending moral and religious legal legitimacy 
to subsequent executive appointments. 426 Second, and perhaps 
related, gender rights advocates countered rights restrictive 
arguments with rights empowering interpretations of Islam’s 
textual sources, historically misused to subjugate women.427 This 
has been commonly referenced as ‘Islamic feminism.’428 Finally, 
prominent male members of the judiciary supported the 
appointment, thus highlighting the male role in traditional 
societies of facilitating female empowerment and professional 
success.429 
Unlike Indonesia, where courts suffer from a degraded 
image, Egyptian judges are widely respected and well 
compensated.430 This may account for the increased social, 
political, and legal resistance, historically, to women judges in 
Egypt. If women are generally devalued, they may be viewed as 
                                                                                                             
423. See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 166 (“In 1998, when Egyptian women seemed on 
the brink of breaking into the judiciary, prominent judges like Mohammed Magdi 
Murgan panned the idea in the semiofficial press, saying: “The natural place for a 
woman is the house, in the shadow of a man.”). 
424. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 304. 
425. See id. 
426. See, e.g., Elbendary, supra note 275. 
427. See, e.g., Nasrawi, supra note 3. 
428. See BENNETT, supra note 163, at 37 (“The second position represents what 
can be called Islamic feminism, although it has male and female supporters. Much 
discussion focuses on particularly problematic Qur’anic and Hadith verses.”). 
429. See El Sayed, supra note 316. 
430. See generally APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 194. 
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unworthy or undeserving—let alone incapable of managing—a 
position of such great stature. 
Presently, the most prominent issue in the Egyptian context 
is restrictions on women judge’s interpretative rights as 
demonstrated by the continuing controversy surrounding their 
appointment to the State’s administrative courts;431 the rate of 
women serving as judges also lags far behind Indonesia.432 It 
appears that gender rights advocates can borrow the following 
policy initiatives for the Egyptian judiciary from the Indonesian 
model: gender mainstreaming and quota systems.433 Further, the 
significance of rights empowering interpretations of religious 
law and texts cannot be overstated particularly in light of the 
country’s newly adopted Constitution.434 
Like its predecessor, the new Constitution (adopted in 
December 2012), recognizes Islam as the State religion and 
designates Islamic law as the primary source for legislation.435 
Additionally, Al-Azhar’s jurists must now be consulted on all 
Islamic law matters.436 These provisions will undoubtedly 
enhance religion’s influence in law and society, further 
underscoring the importance of religious literacy sounding in 
gender rights empowering interpretations of Islamic law. Again, 
gender mainstreaming policies and quotas should also be 
implemented vis-à-vis the judiciary.437 For instance, gender 
mainstreaming policies may prioritize the significance of 
appointing judges who are committed to gender equality 
irrespective of their gender.438 
                                                                                                             
431. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 304. 
432. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing female judges in Indonesia); see also Egypt 
Judges Row, supra note 330 (stating that there are only forty-two women judges in 
Egypt); cf. Asrianti, supra note 246 (“In 2011, women accounted for 23.4% of all trial 
court judges across Indonesia, and 15.4% of appellate judges.”). 
433. See Asrianti, supra note 246. 
434. See Michael Lipin, Egypt’s New Constitution: How it Differs from Old Version, 
VOICE AM., Dec. 25, 2012, http://www.voanews.com/content/egypt-constitution/
1572169.html. 
435. See Nariman Youssef, Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated, EGYPT INDEP., (Feb. 
22, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-
constitution-translated. 
436. See id. 
437. See Asrianti, supra note 246. 
438. See Anita F. Hill, What Difference Will Women Judges Make? Looking Once More at 
the “Woman Question,” in WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND STRATEGIES 
FOR CHANGE 175, 176 (Barbara Kellerman & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 207). 
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Iran encompasses the most restrictive conditions where 
female exclusion from the judiciary is codified in law.439 
Unfortunately, rights restrictive interpretations of Shii Islam’s 
textual sources have overpowered more inclusive, tolerant 
versions—this represents a formidable challenge in the 
conservative Islamic Republic.440 At the time of this writing, 
gender mainstreaming and quota systems do not represent 
practical policy options.441 Gender rights advocates may borrow 
from the Egyptian model by attempting to cultivate relationships 
with prominent judges and government officials who support 
the appointment of female judges. These men may prove 
powerful allies in related legal reform. 
It is significant to highlight that each of the Muslim 
majority countries analyzed here are culturally distinct and 
geographically diverse. Within each, Islam and its law manifest 
differently.442 Arguably, Indonesian Islam appears the most 
tolerant and inclusive of the three, and Iranian Islam most 
restrictive in orientation.443 Iranian officials must come to realize 
that violating the rights of its female citizenry harms society as a 
whole. 
According to a number of research studies, there is a 
positive correlative relationship between female empowerment 
and contribution and peaceful, prosperous societies.444 This 
point underscores the significance of female participation in all 
aspects of a society, including as a judicial decision-maker. 
Indeed, Muslim women judges arguably enhance perceptions of 
impartiality445 and equality by making the judiciary more 
reflective of their society’s diversity.446 
                                                                                                             
439. See Kadivar, supra note 370, at 107–08. 
440. See id. at 108. 
441. See Asrianti, supra note 246. 
442. See Bennett, supra note 163, at 198. 
443. See Nurlaelawati & Rahim, supra note 197, at 49.  
444. See Deutsch, supra note 395, at F4. 
445. See Hill, supra note 437, at 184–85 (“[T]he role of a judge also has 
significance in terms of perceptions about representation. The face of judging, in an 
emblematic way, matters as a reflection of access to justice; the diversity of the bench 
affects public perceptions of fairness. Finally, diversity among judges is a reflection of 
how power is distributed in the justice system. Professor Judith Resnik states the issue 
clearly: ‘In the contemporary world, where democratic commitments oblige equal 
access to power by persons of all colors whatever their identities, the composition of a 
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That diversity translates into a potentially wider, perhaps 
more representative spectrum of official opinions and 
perspectives on any particular matter.447 As US Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion in 
J.E.B. v. Alabama, a gender discrimination case challenging 
female exclusion from juries, “[o]ne need not be a sexist to 
share the intuition that in certain cases a person’s gender and 
resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the 
case .  .  . Individuals are not expected to ignore as jurors what 
they know as men—or women.”448 The exclusion of women 
from the judiciary can disadvantage litigants.449 
Their presence also has symbolic significance regarding 
official deference to gender equality norms and practices that 
may in turn positively impact popular views and normative 
practice.450 Yet, the role of Muslim women judges has practical 
                                                                                                             
judiciary—if all-white or all-male or all-upper class—becomes a problem of equality and 
legitimacy.’”).  
446. See id. at 175 (“As we contemplate future appointments, it is important to 
consider whether in the twenty-first century the judiciary will be a body that looks more 
like the population it serves.”).  
447. See Lawyer: Female Perspective Needed in Policy-making, NEW STRAITS TIMES, 
Sept. 3, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 17175683 (“More women should be in policy-
making positions, especially in Islamic religious institutions. Syariah lawyer Kamar 
Ainiah Kamaruzaman said women should serve on state religious councils and state 
fatwa councils to give views from a woman’s perspective.”); see also Hill, supra note 437, 
at 177, 183 (“According to Justice Wilson’s assessment, the different life experiences of 
women and men cause them to think differently and to approach the law and legal 
decision making differently. Thus she concluded that including more women in the 
judiciary would change the substance of the law and the processes by which the law is 
decided. . . . For example, political scientists Elaine Martin and Barry Pyle studied high 
courts in all fifty US states, concluding that in divorce decisions ‘a judge’s gender’ 
tended ‘to be the primary predictor of a judge’s vote.’ In addition, Brenda Kruse’s 
research has concluded that Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
are also influenced by their gendered experiences in deciding employment cases. 
There is also considerable evidence that some male judges’ perspectives cause them to 
view women’s experiences very differently that women might. Professor Shirley 
Wiegand has chronicled numerous examples that demonstrate a judge’s apparently 
limited vision.”).  
448. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); see Hill, supra note 437, at 
186–87. 
449. See id.; see also GCC ‘Needs More Female Judges’, supra note 421 (“So when they 
legislate, they legislate for men. That’s why we must have women judges. There are one 
or two in Jordan, but we don’t have any in the GCC.”). 
450. See Hill, supra note 437, at 178. (“The appointment of women to the bench 
would ‘help shatter stereotypes about the role of women in society that are held by 
male judges and lawyers as well as by litigants, jurors and witnesses’; help preserve the 
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effects, too—they help ensure more expeditious resolution of 
legal disputes in courts suffering from backlogs.451 Moreover, 
they help contribute to their familial standard of living, 
country’s economy, and overall social advancement.452 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that Thuml al-
Qahramana’s appointment to adjudicate cases was initially met 
with popular disapproval.453 In fact, people refused to allow her 
to hear their grievances.454 The tide turned only when a 
prominent male judge (Qadi Abu’l-Hasan) publicized his 
approval of her accomplishment, thus positively influencing 
popular opinion. 455 
Indeed, the more things change, the more they appear to 
stay very much the same. 
                                                                                                             
public trust by fostering perceptions of diverse representation in the judiciary; reduce 
problems for women counsel; alter the process of judicial decision-making, and reform 
legal doctrine particularly in such areas as tort, criminal and family law.”). 
451. See generally WOMEN JUDGES IN THE ARAB REGION: POINT, COUNTERPOINT, 
supra note 88. 
452. See id. 
453. See BEWLEY, supra note 1, at 157.  
454. See id. 
455. See id. 
